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Thursday, June 5, 1980

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

5 JUNE 1980

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NATO ministers press for speedy deployment of nuclear weapons

By Elizabeth Pond

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Bodo Air Base, Norway

NATO's defense ministers declared June 4 that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made the production and deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces even more essential now than when NATO decided on this move last December.

At the same time efforts to reach an arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union on these weapons will continue, according to official briefers at the top-secret NATO nuclear planning group (NPG) meeting here June 4 and 5. The briefers were pessimistic about the possibilities, however, since Moscow already has rejected two US offers to negotiate the issue.

As usual at the biannual NPG meetings, very little information was given to the press, which was kept a good distance away from the NATO meeting site on Bodo Air Base. Sessions, which included the usual review of the strategic force and targeting by US Defense Secretary Harold Brown, were presented as a routine monitoring of the progress being made in implementing last December's major NATO decision.

This progress is expected to include announcement of British and Italian siting plans within two months for the new 2,200-mile-range cruise missiles. No similar public announcement will be made for siting of the new 1,200-mile range Pershing II missiles in West Germany, since these will simply replace the old 400-mile-range Pershing I's.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

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Portugal, US float plan for carrier base

By Jimmy Burns

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Lisbon

The US plan to station aircraft carriers in Lisbon Harbor appears to be the first concrete response to Portugal's strong stand on Afghanistan and Iran.

US officials have stressed that the plan is only tentative, but the Portuguese government has confirmed that initial talks have already taken place. A Pentagon mission is expected in Lisbon soon to survey the area.

The possible stationing of the carriers in Portugal is part of the US strategy aimed at boosting naval facilities in Europe in response to rising international tensions. Portugal is one of a number of NATO member countries to have been approached, although Lisbon has been earmarked as one of the more probable sites.

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NEW YORK TIMES

5 JUNE 1980

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Gen. Jones Denies Making Offer To Resign if Reagan Wins Election

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4 — Senator Jesse A. Helms and Gen. David C. Jones made diametrically opposed contentions today as to whether the general would resign as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if Ronald Reagan was elected President.

Senator Helms, Republican of North Carolina, a long-time critic of the nation's top military officer, said, "General Jones has agreed to tender his resignation in January if Governor Reagan is elected."

General Jones, in rebuttal, denied any agreement, saying: "I consider it totally inappropriate for senior military officers to adopt the tradition of political appointees of offering resignations whenever an Administration changes."

Renomination Considered

Last Wednesday President Carter nominated General Jones for another two-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. His nomination requires confirmation by the Senate after hearings before the Armed Services Committee.

Congressional officials said that the hearings, which have not been scheduled, would most likely turn into a broad examination of the Administration's military policies and General Jones's leadership.

A White House spokesman said it had nothing to add to General Jones's statement.

In a telephone interview, Mr. Helms asserted that General Jones, an Air Force officer, "has been a disaster as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs" and that he was "inclined to filibuster that nomination."

He said he was dissatisfied because the general had supported the Carter Administration on the treaty with the Soviet Union to limit strategic arms, the decision not to build the B-1 bomber and the pact under which the Panama Canal zone will be given to Panama.

Senator Helms said, however, that he had told Senator John W. Warner, Republican of Virginia, a member of the Armed Services Committee, "If General Jones gives his gentleman's word that he will resign if Ronald Reagan is President in January, that will suit me fine."

Senator Warner, according to Senator Helms, was eager to avoid a struggle on the floor of the Senate that might endan-

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

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Joint Chiefs chairman denies 'deal' to resign

Washington

Air Force Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly denied a newspaper story that he made a "deal" with congressmen to resign if Ronald Reagan is elected president next November. General Jones said in response to a June 4 Washington Star report to this effect that he had "made no agreements or commitments whatsoever with any members of Congress" to resign after a change of administration.

The Star said General Jones, whose critics consider him too complacent with President Carter's shifts in policy over defense spending and other matters, had agreed to serve only six months of his new two-year reappointment unless Mr. Carter were re-elected.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

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NATO says Soviets have nuclear cruise missiles

Baltic Bodo Air Base, Norway

The Soviet Union now has nuclear cruise missiles on its submarines in the Baltic, US Defense Secretary Harold Brown said Wednesday at a meeting of NATO nuclear planners here. NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns said the weapons threatened not only Norway but also Denmark and West Germany.

According to Western military experts, the new Soviet submarine missile has been developed as a replacement to the older SS M-3.

increase missiles

BODO AIR FORCE BASE, Norway [Reuters]—The top defense officials from the United States and Britain said Wednesday the Soviet Union had increased the number of nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe.

U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown said the Soviet Union has nuclear cruise missiles on its submarines in the Baltic.

British Defense Secretary Francis Pym told reporters that Soviet three-headed SS-20 missiles were coming out at the rate of one every five days instead of one a week six months ago.

Two-thirds of them were aimed at Western Europe and one-third against China, according to Western military sources.

THE TWO SPOKE after a two-day meeting of the defense ministers of 12 countries taking part in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Nuclear Planning Group.

Pym said the Soviet Union has slowed down the phasing out of its older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, which the SS-20s are due to replace.

The defense ministers of the 12 countries taking part in the Nuclear Planning Group expressed concern in their final communique over the retention of Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s.

"This, coupled with the continuing deployment of the SS-20 missiles, might lead to an even larger Soviet superiority in long-range theater nuclear forces in the mid-80s than previously anticipated," they said.

THE MINISTERS called on the Soviet Union to respond positively to NATO's December offer to negotiate controls on this type of weapon.

PORTUGAL CONTINUED

The Carter administration is impressed by the way Portugal's center-right government has gone further than any of its European allies in demonstrating solidarity. Portugal was the first country, after the United States, to withdraw its ambassador from Moscow and to review cultural and diplomatic links with the East bloc after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It was also the first European country to break off trade with Iran, one of its main oil suppliers. Portugal's encouraging response to the aircraft carrier plan is consistent with its hard-line and pro-Western foreign policy.

Last June the country agreed to the continued US use of the strategically important Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores as well as an antisubmarine listening post on the island.

Both facilities theoretically belong to Portugal, but their use by the US is guaranteed within the framework of NATO membership and an existing agreement between the US and Portugal. This contains an implicit understanding that in the event of war the air base can be mobilized. In the 1973 Middle East war it was used as a vital airlift for US military supplies to Israel.

Logistically, the siting of the aircraft carriers could provide a backup to the Azores base in controlling mid-Atlantic sea routes. But officials here say this is only one of various scenarios. It could be used by carriers on their way to the Mediterranean or the Gulf.

The harbor, however, will be used as more than just a stopover. Significantly, the Pentagon team is expected to take a close look at housing and existing facilities for members of the fleet and their families.

The Portuguese government has reacted swiftly and positively to the US request for further facilities. But defense officials in Lisbon have indicated they would prefer the aircraft carriers be stationed in the port of Sines, 100 miles south of Lisbon. They admit this would be politically less sensitive and leave Lisbon less vulnerable to attack.

Portugal has made it known it would expect some compensation for new facilities. The lease on the Azores

deployed in Europe starting in late 1983, according to the December NATO decision. All will be under total American control. They are intended to counter the more than 120 three-warhead mobile SS-20s recently deployed by the Soviet Union against European and Asian targets.

The Soviet Union continues to deploy the 3,000-mile SS-20 at the rate of about one a week. It also is supplementing its current squadron of more than 160 Mach 2.5 Backfire bombers at the rate of 30 a year. The Backfire has a range of 5,500 miles.

So far progress in implementation does not include any binding decision by Belgium to accept deployment of the 48 missiles originally planned for placement in Belgium. Belgian participants at the NPG meeting told their allies, according to briefers, that their government would take a "positive attitude" on the issue but could not guarantee parliamentary approval. Because of domestic opposition Belgium suddenly declared at the December NATO meeting that it would have to wait six months before declaring its position. The six months have almost expired now, but a final Belgian decision has been delayed by political turmoil in Brussels. Belgian sources differ in their estimates of how soon a parliamentary decision might be reached, given the unpredictable future of Belgian politics.

If Belgium should prove unable to accept the new missiles, this would leave Italy as the only continental country other than West Germany willing to accept deployment on its soil. This in turn could embarrass West Germany, which has insisted that the risks of deployment be shared.

The Netherlands has reserved its position on the new nuclear weapons until the end of 1981.

Twelve nations out of NATO's 15 participated in the Bodo NPG meeting. They included Portugal for the first time in recent years but they did not include France, Iceland, and Luxembourg.

GEN. JONES . . . CONTINUED

ger the military budget and other national security matters. And he said Senator Warner had reported that General Jones "has agreed to it."

A spokesman for Senator Warner said that Mr. Warner had met with General Jones and that they had agreed on the interpretation of a law stating that the Chairman "serves at the pleasure of the President."

But it appeared to be there that the differences arose. Senator Helms said he had understood that General Jones would voluntarily submit his resignation. A spokesman for General Jones said that the general would resign only if a President asked for his resignation. And in his statement today, the general said that "any arrangements with members of Congress to resign in the future would be inconsistent with this statute."

Senator Helms's effort to limit General Jones's term in office appears to have generated little support. The spokesman for Mr. Warner said the Senator had "very real concerns about General Jones's performance" but that he "has an open mind" on the nomination.

base was extended only after the US agreed to grant Portugal \$140 million in military and economic aid.

Portugal has not notified the US about the price it might have to pay in the latest venture. But officials here have indicated that Portugal's armed forces, still the least modern within NATO, are in desperate need of new equipment and aid.

NATO, during its recent meeting in Brussels, appears to have had this in mind when it decided to give Portugal three new frigates. The gift — a small part of which will have to be paid for by the Portuguese — was welcomed in Lisbon defense circles as proof that Portugal is being given a new role within NATO. Until now, Lisbon's fear was that better-equipped Spain would preempt any broader NATO role for Portugal.

Further optimism was generated by the announcement from Brussels that Portugal was to be readmitted into NATO's sensitive nuclear planning group.

South Korean General Forms a Parallel Government

By HENRY SCOTT STOKES

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, June 4 — Lieut. Gen. Chon Too Hwan, the army strongman, has completed formation of a new administration dominated by generals that overshadows the civilian cabinet and existing Government, according to Korean and diplomatic sources.

The general, acting behind the scenes and with no publicity in the heavily censored Korean press, made his move against American wishes but has reinforced his grip on power in this strategic nation where nearly 40,000 American troops are based.

General Chon, a tough, balding former paratrooper of 49 who was a favorite of the late President Park Chung Hee, has in the last few days personally appointed 108 field-grade officers, Government officials and professors to 14 key subcommittees in his new administration. The subcommittees will administer all major fields, including justice, the economy and foreign and domestic affairs, according

The subcommittees will report to a 30-member standing committee, formed on Saturday, that is headed by General Chon. Thirteen generals sit on the committee, including all the officers close to General Chon, who form a loose military junta.

There is only a semblance of civilian control preserved under the new arrangement, according to Koreans close to the Government. In theory, the standing committee is subordinate to the 25-member Special Committee for National Security Measures, headed by President Choi Kyu Hah, a career diplomat.

But in practice General Chon is the most powerful man in South Korea, according to Koreans and Western diplomats. His fellow generals hold all the key commands in the Seoul region, and he dominates the military, not Gen. Lee Hi Song, who, as Martial Law Commander and ostensibly the nation's top military officer, reports to President Choi.

Diplomats compared General Chon's move to the strategy of the late President Park, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1961 and then set up a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, composed of generals. This gave him a springboard into national politics and in 1963 he was elected President, a post he held until his murder last October.

The composition of the new standing committee has not been announced, and the public has been told nothing of the subcommittees, which General Chon reportedly plans to use to galvanize a Government that lost impetus after the murder of President Park.

Generals Head 5 Key Groups

The subcommittees, which have authority over the ministries they cover, by-passing the Cabinet, first met last weekend. Five key groups at this level — in charge of finance, home affairs, the anti-corruption drive, culture and information, and a steering general committee — are headed by army generals.

After President Park's death the administration became bogged down, conflicting statistics emerged from economic ministries, and the economy — after two decades of growth close to 10 percent a year — sank into the doldrums.

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WASHINGTON POST

5 JUNE 1980 Pg. 1

Clark Hints He May Open Probe of U.S.

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 4 — Former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark indicated tonight that he will establish and head a commission in the United States to investigate Iran's case against Washington as a first step leading to the release of the 53 American hostages.

The formation of the commission was suggested today by Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. Clark, one of the earliest American supporters of the Islamic revolution that overthrew the shah of Iran 17 months ago, suggested that the commission could use the Freedom of Information Act to obtain secret U.S. government documents.

In a 36-minute meeting with 10 Americans attending a government-sponsored conference here on U.S. imperialism in Iran, Bani-Sadr listed a series of specific steps he said the United States could take to win freedom for the hostages. The hostage issue has plagued U.S.-Iranian relations and carried the constant threat of military action that could spread beyond this country into the already turbulent Persian Gulf area.

According to Los Angeles attorney Leonard Weinglass, Bani-Sadr did not insist on the return of the shah to face trial here and the return of his wealth that Iranian authorities insist he plundered illegally from this country. Those two demands have consistently been made by the militants since they seized control of the U.S. Embassy on Nov. 4.

Bani-Sadr's suggestion today was similar to others made in the last seven months by him and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh as steps that could lead to the release of the hostages. These two men, non-clerical supporters of the Iranian revolution, have been thwarted in their efforts by the hard-time Islamic clerics that have supported the embassy captors and who, some observers here say, have much of the power but none of the responsibility for running Iran.

All these efforts, including a U.N. commission, have been blocked by the militants and the clerics, who have stuck to their demand for the return of the shah and his wealth as the only price of freedom for the hostages.

The Clark commission, however, differs from previous proposals since it would be composed of jurists and attorneys and therefore would not require permission from the United States government. The Iranians would have the satisfaction of airing their grievances fully and the Carter administration would be spared hav-

(See CLARK, Pg 4)

NEW YORK TIMES

5 JUNE 1980 Pg. 15

Carter Calls a Meeting And Offers Assistance In Budget Negotiation

WASHINGTON, June 4 (AP) — President Carter intervened today in the Congressional deadlock over the 1981 budget but was unable to resolve the dispute that is threatening to bankrupt some government programs.

Mr. Carter met at the White House for 50 minutes with the chairmen of the House and Senate Budget Committees, Representative Robert N. Giallardo, Democrat of Connecticut, and Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina.

After the meeting, Mr. Giallardo said Mr. Carter had offered to help in the negotiations between the House and Senate over a budget for the fiscal year 1981, which starts Oct. 1.

But Mr. Giallardo added: "Hollings and I aren't any closer."

Compromise Rejected

The House voted overwhelmingly last week to reject a compromise budget proposal prepared by a House-Senate conference committee that called for \$613.3 billion in overall spending and a \$500 million surplus.

Mr. Carter, Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. and many House liberals opposed the proposal, saying it provided too much money for the military and too little for social programs. And Republicans objected to its lack of a tax cut.

Mr. Carter's announced before the House vote that he opposed the compromise plan, leading Mr. Hollings to denounce the President's position as the "height of hypocrisy."

Mr. Hollings was not available for comment about today's meeting with Mr. Carter.

Meanwhile, House leaders decided against immediately supporting waivers of the 1980 budget ceiling, which was breached earlier this year and is now preventing Congress from approving additional money for a number of programs.

Although several programs are running out of money, Mr. Giallardo said the leadership wanted to wait at least until next week before deciding whether to allow votes on the emergency bills.

Wants Differences Resolved

Mr. Giallardo said that to waive the ceiling now would reduce the pressure on Congress to resolve its differences over the 1981 budget and make a "charade" of the budget process.

Besides setting spending targets for fiscal 1981, the new budget package would raise the 1980 ceiling and permit action on the additional current-year spending.

Under the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, new money bills cannot be considered once the spending limit is exceeded unless majorities in both houses vote to grant a waiver, as was done last month to keep the food stamp program in business.

Special Federal unemployment benefits to about 600,000 jobless workers were expected to run out Friday. Disaster relief funds, burdened by an unexpectedly large number of natural catastrophes, are already depleted. And benefits to coal miners suffering from black lung disease will run out this month, Mr. Giallardo said.

'72 crippling of U.S. ship cited

From London Daily Telegraph

Rotterdam, Netherlands—A surprised audience of several hundred senior naval officers, technicians, warship designers and industrialists from 20 countries, have heard for the first time the full details of what was said to be the only modern warship to undergo a live missile attack.

Rear Adm. Julian Lake, former head of the U.S. Navy's electronics command at the Pentagon, told a conference of the International Naval Technology Exposition in this city how a missile that was launched accidentally from a fighter plane had crippled the missile-destroyer Worden in 1972.

He recounted the incident—which took

place off Vietnam and was hushed up at the time—to show how vulnerable modern warships are to quite small weapons.

The weapon, a Shrike missile designed to knock out a ship's radar, exploded 80 to 100 feet above the Worden. The admiral said the missile's warhead weighed only 60 pounds, yet it showered the Worden with splinters that killed or injured about 30 men and put the ship's radar and its lighting and radio systems out of action.

Admiral Lake appealed for the use of plastic coating for aluminum in warships to reduce casualties and damage from splinters. He advocated the use of smoke flares to defeat laser-guided weapons.

SAN DIEGO UNION Pg. 2
29 MAY 1980 (5 JUNE)

Big New Soviet Cruiser Said On Sea Trials

By L. EDGAR PRINA

Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union has sent its new battle cruiser Kirov, the world's largest nuclear-powered warship save for three U.S. aircraft carriers, to sea for its first trial runs, Pentagon sources said yesterday.

The sources said the 800-foot-long cruiser had a standard displacement of about 22,000 tons. This would mean that, at full load, it would displace close to 30,000 tons.

The largest non-carrier nuclear surface warship in the U.S. fleet is the 19-year-old cruiser Long Beach. It displaces 17,100 tons at full load.

A Navy spokesman said the Kirov "bristles with missiles," being armed with a new-generation, long-range anti-ship cruise missile, two anti-air missile systems and a dual-purpose gun for bombardment.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
4 JUNE 1980 (5) Pg. 2

Nomination Wins Backing

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday approved and sent to the Senate the nomination of Richard McCall, one of its former staffers, to become assistant secretary of state.

KOREAN -- CONTINUED

Unemployment is now over 800,000 in a population of 37 million, economic growth is negative and the trade deficit is expected to set a record of \$6 billion this year.

Getting the economy moving again is the most crucial task for the emerging military junta. Another bringing to trial civilians arrested by the military on May 17, when the Government imposed full martial law, closed the National Assembly and universities, and arrested 55 dissidents and opposition leaders.

But General Chon's immediate task is to get his subcommittees working. There were already signs that this would not be easy. Professors appointed to several of the groups, in some cases without their approval, are said to have quickly resigned or to have suddenly become ill.

Each of the 14 subcommittees is said to have eight or nine members, and all include one or two colonels or lieutenant colonels as well as technocrats and professors.

Younger Officials Chosen

The relationship of the new subcommittees to the ministries is a key to the success of General Chon's administration. The general has picked younger government officials to insure coordination between the subcommittees and the civilian ministers they will control.

"These young officials, who served under this or that minister," said a Korean editor, "will now be in a position to ask their former bosses for a briefing on any topic."

General Chon also has to surmount a personal revulsion to him among some Koreans after the Kwangju rebellion. In leading the new administration and imposing his will on civilians with whom he previously had almost no dealings, he must spread his influence far outside the army to control officials and, through them, business and the public.

More Demonstrators Freed

SEOUL, June 4 (UPI) — The Government today released 206 more of the demonstrators arrested in Kwangju. The authorities have said that 1,740 people were arrested in the uprising.

ing to take part in what would what promises to be a long attack on U.S. policy in Iran.

Although Iranians insist the United States should release all its documents on its public and clandestine activities in Iran during the past 27 years, these are really not needed by any commission. Iranian students claim to have found documents in the U.S. Embassy and in the files of Iranian ministries showing how the United States was involved in Iranian affairs.

These documents allegedly include a top secret message talking about American-supported plans for a military takeover of this country just after the shah fled.

Moreover, Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has given the newly elected parliament sole authority on the hostage fate. The parliament is controlled by hard-line, clerical Islamic Republic Party, many of whose members have indicated already they favor putting the hostages on trial here before releasing them.

In any case, it appears it will take the parliament more than a month to organize and select a prime minister. Only then, probably in late July, will it begin to take up the hostage issue.

Further adding to the complicated political situation here, Islamic Republic Party leader, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, today derided the international conference. The meeting was established by Bani-Sadr and is headed by Ghotbzadeh as a way to bring world attention to what they consider the long-time interference by the United States in Iran's internal affairs, including returning the shah to the throne in 1953 through a CIA-sponsored coup.

Beheshti has emerged as Bani-Sadr's main political opponent, challenging all the president's prerogatives under the new constitution. Although Bani-Sadr is considered a favorite of Khomeini, he appears to be losing most of the battle to Beheshti, which further complicates efforts to release the hostages who have become a pawn in Iran's internal political battles.

Nonetheless, Weinglass said he thought Bani-Sadr's plan was a well considered effort to end the hostage crisis and its release today was meant as a message to the United States. But some of the other Americans at the meeting said the Iranian president was merely floating ideas that could possibly help get the hostages free.

Among the main points that Bani-Sadr raised as conditions for the hostages' release was a pledge by the United States not to interfere any more in Iran's internal affairs. Included in that pledge, Weinglass said, would be assurances that the United States would take no punitive action against Iran for holding the hostages.

Meanwhile, Khomeini said today that President Carter should be put on trial for threatening Iran and asserted "the superpowers will . . . not have the slightest effect on our will," the 80-year-old revolutionary leader said in a radio and television message. "We are not afraid of anything."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 5 JUNE 1980 Pg. 6

NATO to deploy cruise missiles in Britain, Italy

BODO AIR BASE, Norway [Reuters]—Britain and

Italy will be the first European countries to receive cruise missiles from the United States when deployment of the new weapons begins at the end of 1983, American officials said Tuesday.

Foreign Aid Measures Face Hard Fight

By GRAHAM HOVEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4 — Administration forces in the House tried today to fight off crippling amendments to a \$5 billion foreign aid authorization for fiscal 1981.

As they did so, however, they were conscious that they had still not been able to obtain enactment of an \$8.1 billion foreign aid appropriation for fiscal 1980, which ends in less than four months.

This overlap of legislation was only one of many difficulties faced by foreign assistance programs, never popular measures but particularly inviting targets for a Congress facing both an election and budget-cutting pressures.

The following were among the difficulties and embarrassments that senior Administration officials have repeatedly said can hamper the conduct of foreign policy:

¶ Funds for the Food for Peace and disaster relief programs have run out, making it impossible for the United States to respond adequately to appeals for help for refugees in Pakistan, Cambodia and Somalia and other countries.

¶ The United States is about \$2 billion in arrears on its commitments to international development banks, including the World Bank, and as a result some of these have had to halt lending operations.

¶ Lack of funds has jeopardized this country's worldwide narcotics control programs, officials say, including efforts to curb heroin traffic from Mexico and Thailand.

Aid Plight Summarized

In a recent speech summarizing the plight of foreign aid, Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher said: "We both withheld our funds to poor nations and went back on our word to our industrial allies — a highly efficient way to antagonize both."

Citing a case that he said "portrays our dilemma vividly," Mr. Christopher mentioned President Carter's urgent request of last November for \$75 million to help Nicaragua recover from a devastating civil war. More than 60 percent of the funds were earmarked for Nicaragua's private business sector.

"Seven months later the money for this urgent proposal remains stalled on Capitol Hill," Mr. Christopher said. "The tendency has been to wait and see whether the new Nicaraguan Government passes ideological muster."

Nicaraguan Aid Eliminated

Meanwhile, he added, Cuba rushed assistance to Nicaragua within a few weeks of the overthrow of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

"We cannot guarantee that democracy and a pluralistic Government structure will succeed in Nicaragua," he said. "But if we turn our back on Nicaragua we can help assure that it will not succeed."

Despite strenuous Administration lobbying, the House voted overwhelmingly last week to eliminate \$5.5 million for military training and noncombat military equipment for Nicaragua in the 1981 aid bill.

The sponsor of that amendment, Representative Robert E. Bauman, Republican of Maryland, often the leader of a bipartisan conservative bloc in the House, said he would try later in the debate to eliminate the remaining \$55 million in economic and food aid for Nicaragua.

Both houses have approved an identical authorization for the \$75 million in

BALTIMORE SUN 5 JUNE 1980 Pg. 13

Carter draft registration plan faces Senate filibuster

Washington (AP)—President Carter's draft registration plan became embroiled in its last major congressional battle yesterday as opponents, lacking enough votes to kill it, began a filibuster to try to talk it to death.

The Senate opened debate on a House-passed plan to spend \$13.3 million to begin registering 19- and 20-year-old men at post offices this summer.

An amendment to require registration of women along with men was promised by Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R. Kan.), the Senate's lone woman member.

No one has been registered for military service since 1975 when President Gerald R. Ford signed a proclamation putting the Selective Service System in "deep standby." Actual conscription ended in 1973.

As the debate opened, Senator Robert Byrd (D. W. Va.), the Democratic leader, said registration would be a signal to the Soviet Union and U.S. allies "of our determination to place our armed forces in a state of preparedness in the event of a military emergency."

"Reinstitution of military registration will demonstrate our resolve to back up our foreign policy pronouncements with military strength," Mr. Byrd said.

Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R. Ore.), a leader of the opponents, said registration would have "a very divisive impact" on the country and would not help solve military manpower problems, such as the exodus of career personnel for higher-paying civilian jobs.

Mr. Hatfield said that in political terms, "we have isolated the president on this issue."

He noted that all of Mr. Carter's rivals for the White House—Ronald Reagan, Edward M.

Kennedy and John B. Anderson—oppose registration.

For nearly five hours, Mr. Hatfield held the floor, talking almost nonstop except when interrupted by questions. He called registration one of the most important issues since the Vietnam War, but frequently he was the only senator on the floor.

Mr. Hatfield also argued that the courts and prisons are not equipped to handle the possible felony cases that would result from youths who fail to register. The maximum penalty for not registering is five years' imprisonment and a \$10,000 fine.

Supporters of registration are expected to present their arguments today when the debate resumes.

Mr. Hatfield, at a news conference, estimated that 35 of the 100 senators are firmly opposed to registration, 20 are undecided and 45 support it.

The administration estimates it has at least 60 senators on its side.

The key question is how long Mr. Hatfield and his allies can keep up a threatened filibuster that would block a final vote on registration.

Mr. Hatfield said he hoped to prolong the debate long enough so that other bills are delayed and the leadership becomes so frustrated that it withdraws registration.

Mr. Byrd said he would not immediately file a cloture petition to choke off a filibuster, but he was expected to file a petition by the end of the week.

If 60 senators vote for cloture, debate on an issue is limited to 100 hours of further discussion.

Mr. Byrd and Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R. Tenn.), the minority leader, both support registration.

Nicaraguan aid requested in November, but the funds are tied up in the 1980 aid appropriations bill. That measure has been awaiting final Senate-House agreement on a bill to lift the Congressional budget ceiling for this year.

Aid Tied to 1979 Levels

The Administration, meanwhile, can dispense foreign aid only under what is called a continuing resolution adopted by Congress, which authorizes aid spending at or below the levels laid down for 1979.

Under that resolution, the United States can provide only \$163 million of a total of \$1.026 billion that would be necessary to meet this country's commitment to the World Bank's Selective Capital Increase agreed on in 1977.

That situation not only hampers the bank's operations, its officials say, but would have the effect of reducing the United States voting power to a point where it would lose a veto over some bank operations.

The Administration is also millions of dollars in arrears on its commitments to the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Fund and the African Development Fund, although both houses have passed a \$3.6 billion authorization for these agencies.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

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NATO ministers say the Soviets have increased the number of nuclear weapons aimed at Western Europe.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and British Defense Secretary Francis Pym made the joint announcement following a two-day meeting in Norway of the defense ministers from 12 countries participating in NATO's nuclear planning group. They said the Soviet Union has nuclear-armed cruise missiles on its submarines in the Baltic Sea and its three-warhead SS-20 missiles were being moved at the rate of one every five days instead of the one-a-week rate of six months ago. Two-thirds of the weapons are aimed at Western Europe and a third against China.

Forces at 'Minimum Readiness'

By JIM GIBNEY

Special to The Denver Post

COLORADO SPRINGS — The country's military forces are at the "minimum level" of readiness for armed conflict, a top Air Force official stated at a weekend press conference at the Broadmoor Hotel.

Joseph C. Zengerle III, 37, assistant secretary for manpower, reserve affairs and installations, said: "The military forces are very ready, but I think there are areas where we need to concentrate our attention to ensure that (downward) trends that have persisted for the past 10 years don't continue."

"We are, in my judgment, at the minimum level where we could say confidently that we are ready for circumstances that might call us to rely upon the military forces of this country, in terms of people, installations, spare part for equipment, and so on," he continued.

Increased Soviet spending for its armed forces over the past 10 years shows the United States is "lagging substantially behind," Zengerle noted,

adding this is not the "prudent time" to cut our nation's defense spending.

Zengerle, a former Washington, D.C., lawyer, who assumed his present duties Feb. 15, was in Colorado Springs to attend the Air Force Association's recognition of Cadet Squadron 4, this year's outstanding unit at the Air Force Academy.

The formal banquet was held Saturday night at the Broadmoor International Center.

Zengerle told reporters, "The problems we are having in obtaining and retaining experienced personnel are the most significant problems the Defense Department is facing today."

Inflation is fast eroding military pay, particularly for those in the enlisted ranks, whom he described as "hard-pressed," and the Air Force official said military people feel their service isn't recognized by the public.

"It is the propensity of the American people to turn away from the military establishments after a war," Zengerle affirmed, adding, "It is historical, it is documented, it is

understandable."

The Vietnam War outcome prompted that feeling among Americans, he stated, calling the Southeast Asian conflict "our most painful experience since the Civil War."

"But with the erosion of time," he went on, "I think we have come to a status where we are more alert to the present situation," which he feels resulted from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the "unfortunate outcome" of the planned rescue of the 53 American hostages in Iran.

"I would hope the American people would come to realize the great value that is provided by those who serve our country in uniform, and I would hope they would recognize the great quality of our men and women who are serving the country today," he stated.

Zengerle said the Department of the Air Force has more than 1 million people assigned worldwide: 550,000 active duty personnel, 150,000 Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard men and women, 250,000 federal civilians and 80,000 civilians under contract.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

4 JUNE 1980 Pg 1B (5)

Tour of U.S. Navy Carrier Impresses Chinese Officials

By DAVID SMOLLAR

Times Staff Writer

ABOARD THE USS RANGER—A welcome in Chinese boomed over the loudspeakers of the Ranger on Tuesday, highlighting the incongruity of top military officials from the People's Republic of China touring a front-line American aircraft carrier for the first time.

The group of 24 Chinese officials, in the United States to explore arms purchases, came away impressed with the display of American naval power.

"It's very good," wrote Yu Xitao, Chinese Army deputy chief for weapons, in a reporter's notebook after watching an hour of jet take-offs and landings from the Ranger's crowded flight deck.

And the group, led by Vice Premier Geng Biao, stood and applauded after an F-14 Tomcat fighter roared past the visiting dignitaries at less than 100 yards and rocked the massive carrier as it broke the sound barrier.

"A good performance," whispered another high-ranking Chinese weapons expert as the group left the flight deck to the applause and cheers of almost 1,000 Ranger personnel who

lined the area for a glimpse at the unusual visitors.

The Chinese were taken by helicopter to the Ranger, on training maneuvers about 50 miles west of San Diego, for their first look at U.S. carrier operations. The Chinese fleet is largely a coastal defense force and has no ships larger than destroyers.

The Ranger demonstration for Geng Biao, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party's military committee, reciprocated a January visit to Chinese fleet headquarters in Shanghai by U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown.

Geng and his chief aide, Gen. Liu Huaqing of the Chinese general staff, showed particular interest in explanations of the advanced aircraft on display in the Ranger's flight hangar.

"Yes, yes, yes," nodded Geng during the hour-long explanation led by Rear Adm. Huntington Hardisty of the Navy's Pacific air fleet.

Gen. Liu climbed into the pilot's seat of an F-14 after pilot Lt. Henri Miller and Lt. Chris Quinn, radar officer, pointed out the plane's weapons systems.

"He wanted to know how far the radar can 'see,' how good the Phoenix

(air-to-air) missile is and what all the levers meant," Quinn said later. "And he wanted also to sit in the back (the radar officer's seat) but I couldn't let him—that's a secret area."

Liu looked closely at the firing systems on all the aircraft. "He was asking pretty intelligent questions," said Lt. George Mayer, who flies an A-7 Corsair attack jet for the Ranger. Indeed, Liu took notes several times as he learned the combat ranges and destructive capabilities of each model.

"How do you find the Russian submarines?" asked Han Xu, director of logistics in the U.S. affairs section of the foreign ministry as he was shown an S-3 Viking anti-submarine plane.

After a brief laugh, Lt. Col. Bill Webb, Air Force attache at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, sketched the Viking's sensing systems.

A sense of cooperation with the Chinese was evident throughout the Ranger despite memories of the Navy's past battles with Chinese forces and weaponry in Korea and Vietnam.

There were a couple of isolated complaints: "God-damaged Communists," grumbled a flight deck technician as the helicopter carrying Geng touched down Tuesday morning.

Said a veteran air operations officer who fought in Korea, "I ought to keep my feelings to myself." But after a moment's reflection, he added, "yet hell, today's enemies are tomorrow's friends and you can't hold a grudge forever."

Geng sat in the viewing swivel chair of Ranger Capt. Roger E. Box and smiled when an F-14 turned on its afterburner during a catapult launch to demonstrate its speed.

"They are really taking this in," marveled one U.S. official escorting the Chinese party. "It's something that we certainly wouldn't extend to the Soviets," although he stressed that the Chinese were not shown anything of a sensitive nature.

Ranger crew members were told to put away any secret documents when they cleaned the ship on Monday in preparation for the visit.

But future discussions of arms purchases appear likely to go beyond the limited agreements reached in Washington last week to allow production in China of American-designed helicopters and computer equipment.

The Chinese have asked the United States for advanced weapons systems similar to those sold to Middle Eastern nations. And an army officer accompanying the tour Tuesday said he "expects to be busy" when he assumes the post of military attache in Beijing in August.

ATLANTA JOURNAL 3 JUNE 1980 (5)

Chemical War Test

The Associated Press

LONDON — British soldiers have taken part in what the Defense Ministry says is the first big chemical warfare defense exercise organized by

a NATO power. The gas was a stinging type used against rioters, but the army said the protective clothing and training was designed to withstand several kinds of killer gas.

EDITORIALS

NORFOLK VIRGINIAN PILOT 27 MAY 1980 (5 JUNE)

China's Missile Thunder

Nineteenth Century China was compared to a sleeping giant which, once awakened, would shake the earth.

The earth trembled last Sunday as the giant opened one eye, squinted down 6,250 miles of Asia and the South Pacific, and fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the pocket of ocean between Micronesia and Melanesia. Thunder came up like dawn. The world became a bit less secure.

The windows rattled more in the Kremlin than in the Pentagon. The Chinese ICBM, when operational, will extend the reach of Chinese arms from the sparsely populated east into the Soviet Union's European heartland. Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev will no more be out of range. New York, Washington, and Chicago will remain safe. The Chinese missile will reach no farther than our West Coast.

But we should not rejoice at this bit of Soviet discomfort. The potential danger is worldwide. China is still a wild card, and her hand hasn't been played out.

Up to now, the Chinese military presence along the Soviet Union's southeastern border has had a sobering influence on Moscow. It inhibits Soviet adventurism in Europe. From that standpoint, the West can take pleasure over the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

But open war between the two red giants has been viewed as a dreadful eventuality, with unforeseeable consequences. The U.S. strategy has been to exploit the rift without magnifying it into open conflict.

The Chinese, for their part, are determined to forge their nation of a billion poor people into a modern state by the year 2000. They intend to stand on their own feet, free at last of the weakness that made them a prey to the Russians, the Japanese, and the Western colonial powers for the century preceding World War II. A modern defense establishment is one of the goals of their "Four Modernizations."

The new missile, which can mate to the hydrogen bomb they

developed in 1967, serves notice that China is not kidding. Though no match for the formidable arsenal of the Soviet Union, the ICBM comes with a billion people behind it, and the sheer numbers are frightening to the Kremlin.

The danger now is that the Soviets will be goaded into a massive escalation of the arms race or—worse yet—be spooked into a pre-emptive strike against China. The Chinese evidently take this possibility very seriously. They have been building an elaborate system of underground shelters to protect their population from nuclear blasts.

The U.S. can play only a limited role in restraining the two quarreling Communist powers. About the most it can do is avoid pouring gasoline on the fire. China seeks Western help with modernization of her agriculture, her industry, and her science and technology. In the fourth modernization—the military—she should be left on her own. She seems to be doing only too well anyhow.

ATLANTA JOURNAL 2 JUNE 1980 (5)

Chinese ICBMs Discomforting

Columbus Ledger

CHINA HAS successfully completed its first full flight tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Chinese ICBMs are said to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead anywhere in the Soviet Union—or to the U.S. West Coast.

Years ago news that an ICBM had been successfully tested by the mainland Chinese would have been greeted with near-hysteria in some quarters in this country. That has changed dramatically, and for that we must give former President Richard Nixon most of the credit.

The Chinese themselves have been careful to state that their chief defense goal is building defenses against any threat from the "hegemonists"—the code word by which the Chinese identify the USSR. So the news that an ICBM from the People's Republic of China could reach the West Coast has failed to stir even the Neanderthals of the right. That group has more or less discontinued what used to be its strident and regular warnings against the Yellow Peril.

Too, China's ICBM program is in its infancy. U.S. officials in Washington said that even with an accelerated program, the Chinese could deploy no more than a dozen long-range

missiles in the next five or six years. The United States and the Soviets are each reported to have more than 1,000.

But the mere fact that China now has a successful ICBM program should give us pause. China and Russia share the longest contiguous border in the world, and their bitter quarrel shows no sign of subsiding.

If in a moment of fury or miscalculation the Chinese should launch an ICBM at the Russians, the consequences to the world could be catastrophic.

It could be even more so for the United States in case the Russians don't know exactly where the missile came from, and launched a retaliatory attack on us instead of the Chinese.

Such a possibility is remote. And as arms proliferate, the chance of mankind's not making it to the 21st century became chillingly real.

The dawn of the new cold war which now threatens us is not a propitious time to talk arms control. But there is a terrible danger that the world may lurch into war through chance and miscalculation.

The increasing number of devastating weapons owned by an increasing number of nations enhances the possibility a thousand-fold.

Time to speak up

The major American foreign policy preoccupation these days is with finding ways to counter a growing Soviet military expansion, widely perceived by us as threatening to our interests. There are a number of manifestations of this Soviet "threat":

- a penchant for overt military adventurism, as demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan;
- an uninhibited buildup of conventional military forces in the Middle and Far East as well as in Europe;
- a matching (some would even have it overtaking) of U.S. theatre nuclear force deployments in Europe, especially emphasizing intermediate-range rockets deployed on Soviet territory; and, finally,
- a determined buildup of the most advanced inter-continental nuclear delivery systems, surpassing the U.S. nuclear deterrent forces in number, if not yet in quality.

These developments have led to the widespread conviction—both in the United States and among our allies—that we are no longer "number one" in the nuclear arms competition.

Unfortunately, this change in perception comes at a time when being number one is considered by most "analysts" to bestow more than just psychological advantage. What has changed, in the last decade or so, is not so much the properties of strategic weapons, but the doctrines relating to their use. The old concept of nuclear deterrence—deployment of strategic systems to ensure against the temptation of their first use by one's adversary—is not particularly sensitive to who's ahead in numbers or types, as long as there is a very rough parity between the adversaries. But the newly-popular concept of nuclear war-fighting demands not only real, but also perceived advantages on one's side in order to be most effective.

All this is, of course, entirely theoretical—a question,

almost, of theology—mainly contrived by the military technocrats on both sides to keep the research and development funds flowing in ever greater abundance. In the real world, any sane and reasonably knowledgeable individual recognizes that nuclear arms remain entirely without utility, whether for handling the kind of frustrating Third World chaos symbolized by Iran, for countering aggression such as we have seen in Afghanistan, or, most especially, for actually being used in any conceivable military conflict between the superpowers.

Nevertheless, the charade goes on, as demonstrated vividly in the special report on the defense establishment contained in this issue. It is precisely this unrelenting accumulation of arms, combined with the generally accepted sense of antagonistic competition with the Soviets, that makes the present situation so dangerous. It is almost impossible for me to conceive of the current trends ending anywhere short of disaster. Yet our leaders behave as though what is going on between us and the Russians is a perfectly normal mode of behavior. Perhaps, they say, the Soviets are being rather more intransigent than we would like, but a tough stance and boycotting the Olympics will soon bring them to heel. And the public in general—aside from a frustration over the hostages in Iran—finds the media scorekeeping in the Soviet-American nuclear competition somewhat less interesting than the start of the baseball season, while the Administration is more and more prone to ill-considered actions.

What is needed is a formula for arousing national and international consciousness to the dangers. We need a large and active constituency, able to exert political and moral pressures on Carter and Brezhnev to get moving, to put an end quickly to the deadly nuclear competition and get us off the road to war.

Where do we find that constituency and how do we get to it? That is the deadly dilemma of the 1980s, to which my generation has been unable to respond. Perhaps the answer will be given by one of our younger readers in response to our Rabinowitch essay competition. However it comes, we must fervently hope that the answer will precede the holocaust. □

ATLANTA JOURNAL 2 JUNE 1980 (5)

Arms Contract

A LARGE NATION dedicated to expanding its influence and control over others can choose from a multiple of means for achieving that objective.

For example, the Soviet Union used naked aggression to exert its influence and control over Afghanistan.

But in exerting its influence—it may be premature to refer to control at this point—over the nearby country of India the Soviet Union is using more subtle methods. The Soviets have fashioned an arms contract for the Indians which is so attractive the Indians could not refuse it. And the terms make India totally dependent upon the Kremlin for military hardware over a period of years.

The announcement that India has signed a \$1.6 billion arms deal with the Soviets—the largest military contract in India's history—can only make neighboring Pakistan and neighboring People's Republic of China feel a degree of nervousness over the spread of Soviet influence. Thus the arms deal should contrib-

ute to further instability in that critical area.

According to reports, the Indians tested both Soviet and Western military weapons and found the Soviet arms superior—which is hardly reassuring for the West. In addition, the Soviets offered a ridiculously low set of financial terms—2.5 percent interest over a 17-year period.

An arms contract is more than a one-time shot of delivering specific goods. It is a continuing affair because the recipient is dependent upon the provider for spare parts and other supplies. And that is the significance of India's new dependence upon the Soviet Union.

With military hardware as the hostage, the Soviets can count on India's support even more in the future than was the case in the past.

For India to make such a significant move in the aftermath of the blatant and bloody Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can only point to an ominous future in that part of the world.

CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR

5 JUNE 1980

Pg 2

Million-a-minute spending on arms vs. the ecology

Nairobi, Kenya

Global military expenditure is approaching \$1 million per minute and, even without world war, places the environment under constant strain, a UN report said Wednesday. "On any logical analysis the world cannot afford the arms race—the developing countries least of all," it said. "Nuclear world war undoubtedly now constitutes the greatest single threat to man and his environment."

The report was presented by the Nairobi-based United Nations Environment Program in conjunction with the observance today (June 5) of Environment Day.

A POST-DETENTE STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES

HENRY M. JACKSON



THE AUTHOR: Senator Jackson is a ranking member of the Governmental Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and Chairman of the latter's Subcommittee on Arms Control. He is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and in 1979 he was appointed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator Jackson served six terms in the U.S. House of Representatives before being elected to the Senate in 1952.

IN BRIEF

The events in Afghanistan have stripped the illusions from detente, but already new ones are flourishing amid officialdom in Washington. Rationalization to the effect that the Soviets have miscalculated, and that their actions in Afghanistan are drawing heavy penalties in international opinion, clash with the hard fact that international politics are swayed not so much by images of fairness and decency, but rather by strength and will—and in this crucial arena of perceptions, the United States and not the Soviet Union has suffered defeat. Beyond a general rebuilding of America's defenses, which show dire neglect and erosion, some immediate steps are in order, such as a selective call-up of reserves. Moreover, the time has come for the President to cast for genuine bipartisan-ship in foreign and defense policies, and for the inclusion in his Administration of experts who have been vindicated in their realistic view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The theory that has animated American policy toward the Soviet Union over the last decade and under three administrations—that the Soviets, lured by a series of cooperative agreements, would match American concessions and reward American restraint—has been proven dangerously and demonstrably false. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has revealed “detente” as an illusion and Soviet “restraint” as merely the absence of opportunity. And the political, economic and military policies fashioned by the United States to fit that theory now lie in shreds.

For over a decade, Soviet leaders have watched American businessmen stream to Moscow, technology in hand. They have seen U.S. diplomats put forward a seemingly endless series of proposals—on the Indian Ocean, on weapons in space, on conventional arms sales, on forces in Europe, on strategic arms control—all rooted in the assumption that the Soviet leadership basically shared America's desire for accommodation and a stable world order. They have heard prominent U.S. officials declare in public forums that manifestly unequal and un-

verifiable arms control treaties favoring the Soviets are equal, verifiable and favorable to the United States after all. They have been told that restrictions would be placed on their importation of U.S. energy extraction technology while, in fact, not a single license was denied in support of that announced policy.

The leaders in the Kremlin have observed no concerted American reaction as their Cuban surrogates have marched through Africa and the Middle East bearing Russian arms and exploiting the instability of fledgling Third World governments. They have heard no protest from the United States as Moscow provided Fidel Castro with ocean-going attack submarines and high-performance ground-attack aircraft. They have listened as the U.S. Administration called the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba unacceptable one week and acceptable the next. They have heard very little from Washington as their Vietnamese surrogates have pressed into Laos, then into Cambodia, and are now threatening the borders of Thailand.

(See STRATEGY, Pg 2-F)

United States as a factor in Soviet global strategy? It should come as no surprise that the Soviet leaders have concluded that they can crown a decade of "detente" by invading and occupying a sovereign state, or that they believe the response of the West will be weak and insubstantial. The response has been just that.

Despite the tragedy of the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan, one searches in vain for evidence that official Washington grasps the fundamental failure of the policy of detente. It is reported that a senior U.S. diplomat has talked to America's allies about "getting detente back on track." He has overlooked two facts: the locomotive of detente is out of steam; and in any event the track runs only one way—to Moscow.

There are reports that the bureaucrats in the Department of Commerce already are lobbying for exemptions to the new controls on the export of high technology to the Soviet Union, and that they are ready to resume "business as usual" when the storm passes. Chairman Brezhnev must recall clearly that the computer sale to TASS, an organization tightly associated with the KGB, that was cancelled when Anatoly Shcharansky was sentenced, was licensed a few months later when Shcharansky was confined behind the barbed wires of the Gulag Archipelago. Despite evidence that some of the Soviet military trucks that rolled into Kabul were manufactured with American assistance, Commerce Department officers maintain that we were wise to help build the factory that made them.

Where is the reassessment of U.S. policy of the profligate transfer of American high technology to the Soviet Union? Where is the crucial review of the underlying assumptions of U.S. arms control policies? Where is the inquiry to establish why the United States has failed to obtain reciprocity from the Soviets in trade, diplomacy, science and international politics? Have the architects of the policies that have so manifestly failed now been assigned to reconsider them?

Already rationalizations have begun to appear along with the excuses: "The Soviets will get bogged down in Afghanistan." "They have suffered in terms of world opinion." Prominent U.S. officials, who have miscalculated Soviet policies and intentions with glaring consistency, now proclaim that the Soviets, in taking Afghanistan, have committed a "miscalculation." They have wandered into a "quagmire," so the argument runs, from which they will emerge chastened and diminished.

Some U.S. officials content themselves with believing that America's unhappy experience in Vietnam will inevitably befall the Soviets wherever they might choose to intervene. But Afghanistan is not Vietnam, and the Russians are not Americans. They have crossed an international border with seven divisions and imported hundreds of Soviet bureaucrats to administer the civil government. They have moved ruthlessly to crush all resistance. Afghanistan is not a divided country that the Soviets are helping to defend against an invad-

moscow is the self-delusion that the Soviets have suffered a loss in "world opinion." It is undoubtedly true that the invasion of Afghanistan has colored the way in which the Soviet Union is viewed by countries around the world. In the area most immediately affected, the Soviets are surely perceived as ruthless, powerful and on the move.

And what are the likely consequences of such a perception among such countries as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Oman? Will they now rally to the West, offended by Moscow's determination to work its will with invading military forces? Or will they draw a contract between the Soviet Union advancing, the West retreating? Will they conclude they are safer aligned with nice guys who are not powerful in the region, or with tough Kremlin leaders who are increasingly powerful and assertive?

The unpleasant truth is that the opinion that counts in international politics is formed not by images of fairness or decency, but of strength and will. And with respect to that crucial opinion, it is the United States and not the Soviet Union that has suffered a defeat.

The Consequences of Shifting Power

For a decade, the West has been receding into the shadows of growing Soviet military strength. While U.S. defense budgets were declining, Soviet military spending rose dramatically. While American diplomats were negotiating, Soviet decisionmakers supervised a doubling of their strategic forces. As the deficiencies in the American posture have become obvious, and as the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States in one after another component of military power, Soviet actions have betokened a growing boldness. By contrast, U.S. policies have reflected sharpened internal divisions, pervasive uncertainty and ever greater diffidence to Moscow.

Now, after a decade in which the Soviets have allocated 30 per cent more funds overall than the United States to defense—50 per cent more in 1979—the United States has plunged from strategic superiority to the verge of strategic inferiority. In strategic forces the Soviet Union has outspent the United States by 160 per cent. In 1979, while we waited for the fruits of detente to register Soviet restraint, the figure grew to nearly 200 per cent.

These differences in the pattern of spending are reflected in the aggregate sizes of the U.S. and Soviet forces. While force ratios are not an absolute measure, they are instructive. The Soviets now lead the United States in tanks by 5 to 1; in armored personnel carriers by 4 to 1; in artillery pieces by 8 to 1; in tactical aircraft by 2 to 1; in submarines by over 3 to 1; in naval surface combatants by 1.5 to 1; and the throw-weight of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force now exceeds that of the United States by at least 300 per cent. In ground forces the Soviet advantage is equally

(See STRATEGY, Pg 3-F)

Although each Soviet division is somewhat smaller in number of men than its U.S. counterpart, the Soviets have fielded over 170 active and reserve divisions to our 28, including 7 airborne divisions to our 2. And as the invasion of Afghanistan has shown, Soviet reserve forces, unlike most of our own, are well trained, equipped and ready.

But aggregations of power do not tell the full story. What matters most from a geopolitical point of view, when comparing military forces, is how each side is able to bring effective power to bear in regions where conflict is likely—or where conflict, if it does take place, is likely to be decisive. Here the Soviets enjoy an enormous geographical advantage by commanding the interior lines of communications in huge expanses of the Eurasian landmass. Thus they are proximate to, and able quickly to inject force into, areas long considered vital to the West. By contrast, the United States, surrounded by oceans that in an earlier day served as moats of protection, must move great distances to fight and to support its forces. Nowhere is this more dramatic than with respect to the reservoirs of oil on which the West depends in the Persian Gulf. Soviet forces are now ensconced a mere 300 miles from the Gulf. In terms of effectively available combat forces, the United States is 8,000 miles away. The simple comparison is as follows: in the time that it would take the United States to move a single U.S.-based division to the Persian Gulf, the Soviets could deploy 10 divisions.

It is all very well to declare that the United States will fight to prevent vital oil resources from coming under the control of the Soviet Union. But with what means is that defense of our vital interests to be mounted? A decade ago we would have relied on the weight of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority to deter adventurous Soviet moves that could lead to direct confrontation. Today that strategic weight not only is no longer there, but the advantage is shifting to the Soviet Union.

The United States is in a dangerous position across almost the entire spectrum of military power. And our wounds are largely self-inflicted, the product of a decade of wishful thinking and inadequate action.

Deep Gaps in the U.S. Posture

Those of us who have followed the state of our defenses through the hearings and investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, and especially in connection with Senate consideration of the SALT II Treaty before it was set aside, have come to understand the depth of U.S. deficiencies with respect to the readiness of its conventional forces, and how seriously the nuclear balance, strategic and tactical, has shifted against us. In areas of the world where any sensible strategy dictates the availability of weeks of ordnance and other supplies, we have been reduced to a few days. The specifics are genuinely shocking: With respect to one sort of conventional munition, which I will not identify because of security constraints, we have enough to sustain only four days' fighting in Europe at normal utilization rates; NATO

shortfalls exist. The deficiencies run so deep and so broadly that there is simply no short-term solution. The capacity of industry to replenish depleted stocks is severely limited, the consequence of years of neglect and the attrition that inevitably followed an almost lackadaisical approach to defense procurement.

The situation with respect to U.S. military manpower is even more disturbing than the deplorable state of its supply of expendables. The specialists and technicians on whom a modern fighting force depends are leaving the Army, Navy and Air Force in droves. These are the trained men and women who operate radars and other sophisticated electronic gear, repair complex aircraft, train and supervise inexperienced personnel and otherwise enable the mass of men and equipment who make up a modern force to fight effectively when called upon to do so.

They are leaving the military services by the thousands. The gaps in their wake have not been filled—and can be filled in effect only by starting all over again: recruiting, training and retraining for multiple tours the crucial support elements that are urgently required. We need to increase dramatically the reenlistment rates that make it possible to retain trained mid-career and senior level enlisted personnel and officers. We must make it clear that we regard them as a national resource that we value highly.

Years of constrained budgets have meant the deferral of crucial maintenance programs and the depletion of spare parts, which are now beginning to manifest themselves in various, often tragic ways. As an example, our tactical aircraft are plagued with maintenance problems. Often fighters and other planes are inoperable for extended periods simply because there are no spare parts to keep them flying. For one first-line U.S. aircraft the supply of spare parts is so short that virtually any malfunction requires that the aircraft be withdrawn from service until the part in question can be removed, flown specially to a distant repair facility, repaired and then flown back for reinstallation in the aircraft. Not even the smallest commercial airline would attempt to operate in this manner. It not only ill befits the U.S. Air Force; it is dangerous to our national security.

These three areas of glaring deficiency—ammunition shortfalls, declining personnel retention and inadequate maintenance of spare parts—are merely the “nuts and bolts” expression of a deeper problem: years of underinvestment in the basic, undramatic components of military power.

The present FY 1981 defense budget request does little to reverse the trends that have brought this sorry state of affairs upon us. Throughout the budget request there are items that are underfunded. For procurement, operations and maintenance, modernization, training and other key needs, the requested amounts are inadequate to give the United States the military capability it requires. In many cases due to inaccurate inflation estimates, the dollars re-

(See STRATEGY, Pg 4-F)

amounts of weapons, equipment or other items. For instance, because of the explosive escalation of fuel costs, the Air Force cannot fund the number of flying hours it planned as the minimum necessary to maintain an adequate level of readiness. Inflation alone does not explain reduced purchases and increased costs. In many cases unnecessarily high additional unit costs are incurred because procurement has been reduced to levels at which production lines cannot operate efficiently.

Coping with these deficiencies will mean more than increased budgets. The defense industrial base of the United States has been permitted to decline to the point where shortages of facilities, equipment and trained labor must be overcome before we can begin to re-arm to satisfactory levels.

The Painful Sobering

If we are to sweep away the illusions upon which a decade of detente has been based, we must understand the nature of the Soviet adversary and the competition between us. The Soviet Union has not become more accommodating as it has become stronger and more secure. On the contrary, it has become more ambitious, aggressive and tenacious in pursuit of imperial interests. The belief that a more powerful Soviet Union would be more tolerant at home has been shattered by the arrest and forced exile of Andrei Sakharov, a man of extraordinary personal courage and humanity.

For Moscow, the U.S.-Soviet relationship is one of unremitting competition. From time to time there may be instances in which the interests of the two superpowers coincide; when this happens, the Soviets will act in accord with their interests. The appearance, then, of "cooperation" is coincidental and transitory. Moscow will cooperate in order to compete more effectively—sometimes to induce a mood of tranquility in the West, but not out of deference to Western interests or desires. Altruism is not a natural Soviet mode of behavior.

From the Soviet tactic to enter agreements that appear cooperative—we can recall the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Treaty of 1950, or for that matter the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty of 1971 or the SALT I agreements—some officials have drawn the conclusion that the U.S.-Soviet relationship is a mixture of "cooperation and competition." This confusion between the appearance of cooperation and the reality of competition has nurtured and sustained the illusions of detente for a decade.

A dramatic shift in the balance of power has transpired these last ten years, in the context of multifaceted arms control negotiations. Was this cooperation or competition? The short answer is that it is the United States that has been cooperating, and the Soviet Union that has been competing.

A generation ago, the distinguished theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had the words for the West's predicament: "If the democratic nations

too little conscience." The United States did not stumble into its present predicament overnight, and it will not extricate itself with simple expedients.

Immediate Requirements

A redressive strategy calls for immediate action to shore up the sagging military posture of the United States. We need an across-the-board, long-term build-up of U.S. military capabilities to meet essential strategic and tactical requirements of the 1980s.

Taking its cue from President John F. Kennedy's actions during the 1961 Berlin crisis, the Administration should begin selectively to call up reserve units to augment the ability of the United States to respond in this period of heightened danger. This would be a measure of the President's stated intent to stage an immediate, serious and visible upgrading in the nation's defenses.

As such renewed investments are made in U.S. defenses, there is no need to abandon the long-standing goal of reaching truly equal and truly verifiable accords with the Soviet Union to limit weapons of mass destruction. But this kind of stabilizing and durable agreement will never be achieved if the United States negotiates from a position of weakness and renders one-sided concessions. And the Soviet leaders should be made to understand that the United States is prepared to live in a world without arms limitation if Moscow persists in its pattern of aggression and expansionism, and continues to present an obdurate position in arms control negotiations.

The friends and allies of the United States must be enlisted in a broad effort to provide for the common defense. The NATO nations need to understand the common necessity to strengthen conventional and theater nuclear forces and to take a broader view of the arena in which our collective interests lie and where NATO nations must be prepared to act if necessary.

The Middle East is of immediate concern. Our NATO partners import 75 per cent of their oil from the Persian Gulf area. Their ability to survive economically and to defend themselves depends on the continuity of that supply. For Japan, the situation is just as critical. The time is overdue for the United States to lead its key allies in a collective effort to organize and plan what needs to be done to assure access to Middle East oil.

This undertaking calls for greater concertation of strategy with friendly nations in the Middle East. We have close relationships in the region that can be expanded into the sinews of common defense. The United States' deep and abiding ties with democratic Israel and its now well-established relationship with Egypt are solid platforms upon which to build. Other moderate Arab states understand the nature of

(See STRATEGY, Pg 5-F)

ESSAY

Rescue Mission Questions

By William Safire.

MEMPHIS, June 4 — Harangues in this space and elsewhere calling for an official inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the mission to rescue the American hostages in Iran have been answered — in part — by the appointment of a Pentagon commission headed by a retired old salt, Adm. James Holloway 3d.

The Holloway commission will limit its study to shortcomings in planning and hopes to tell the Joint Chiefs that all concerned did a grand job, but that next time somebody should check the weather and somebody else should order crew chiefs not to wash down the choppers with salt water just before a big mission. High-ranking officers are not inclined to expose command weaknesses.

The White House and Pentagon thus hope their posteriors will be covered for posterity. A cover-up may be awkward, however, because a secret Congressional report has already concluded that "major errors" were made in the mission's planning and execution.

Some embarrassing questions:

1. *On the planning:* Why was the original, strong-force plan prepared last November scaled down to a light-force plan adopted in the spring? Was this a military decision, or was the first plan rejected by the White

House? Was the military asked for a plan that would have repeated "bail-out" points along the way?

As we know from British commando experience, which was adopted by the Israelis, such a mission requires (a) overwhelming force at the point of attack, (b) unusual mechanical backup, and (c) the mission commander on the scene empowered to make decisions without intrusion from headquarters. Did the White House demand operational command authority? Did the Joint Chiefs acquiesce in a Presidential desire to approve personally each stage of the mission in action? Did the President see any advantage in making a feint and then withdrawing?

Was a change in plan from Air Force helicopters to Navy helicopters made at a high level for other than operational reasons? Why were Navy choppers used that received less than 20 percent of optimal flying time in the three months preceding the mission?

2. *On the operation:* Why did the Air Force colonel, James Kyle, who saw the dust storms from his C-130, and who had a "noninterceptable" radio, not warn the helicopter pilots? On the ground at Desert One, when his secure radio broke, why did he use an old-fashioned radio for communication with superiors in Egypt rather than borrow a noninterceptable radio from his Army colleague?

3. *On the decision to abort:* How unanimous was the recommendation? Was the lack of a sixth helicopter the real reason to abandon the mission? Was the President told the mission was compromised in Teheran? Did the Soviet Union know of unusual electronic traffic that night, and did we learn of unusual Soviet radio traffic in response — perhaps to alert pilots? Did we interpret any Soviet activity as an implicit warning?

What high-level contact was made by the White House to the Kremlin that night? I have heard we initiated contact with the Soviets after the decision to abort, probably because we were

flying into Turkey and did not want to alarm the Russians. Is this true? Or is the unlikely, uglier rumor true — that we called off the mission after the Soviets sent us a message?

4. *On the panicky retreat:* After the President ordered the men to return, was there undue haste in leaving — a rush that led to the blow-up of the refueling helicopter? Why were documents on the abandoned helicopters describing safe houses on the escape route — which would surely incriminate helpful Iranians — not destroyed before departure? Why was Colonel Kyle's later plea to "run some fighters over to destroy the surviving helos" denied? Did the President participate in that craven decision, which may have cost the lives of Iranians who wanted to help us?

That barely scratches the surface of questions raised by Mr. Carter's tentative, hypercautious, escape-hatch-laden foray into military force. How much is the Pentagon to be blamed for a failure which subsequently caused our allies to question our capability and reduced the value of our deterrent? How much blame is to be ascribed to a failure of nerve by the President of the United States?

One man privy to the President's thinking tells me that a serious review of the decision-making in this case is under way at the White House; a National Security Council staffer denies it.

"Some of the things the President did that day cast great credit on him," the first man says. "Some of the things do not." He adds that the immediate exposure of the reasons for aborting the mission would not be in the national interest, and admits that it would certainly not be in the President's interest.

We'll learn the truth someday — unfortunately, not in time to help voters decide whether Jimmy Carter is the best man to serve as Commander in Chief in a crisis.

STRATEGY -- CONTINUED

Russian ambitions in the region. Yet, unfortunately President Carter's State of the Union address failed to explicate how the United States can work with its friends in the region to deal with the full extent of the challenge. Key nations like Saudi Arabia are not as concerned with overt attack from without as with the less obvious tentacles of Soviet influence, subversion and overthrow by coup d'etat. We need to fashion cooperative arrangements with friendly nations in the Middle East to better assist them to counter indirect as well as direct aggression.

Above all, the tradition of bipartisan foreign policy must be revived in the United States as an essential wellspring of national strength and resolve. The survival of the nation in an increasingly hostile world is not a partisan issue, and no one political party has a monopoly on good sense and thoughtful counsel. The President must call on, listen to and exchange ideas with political leaders from the party out of

power as well as leaders in his own party. Rather than perfunctory briefings after the fact, these leaders should be included in the design and development of a strategy and policy which can be sustained over the long term. As a visible move in this direction, and without delay, President Carter should bring into his Administration men and women, Republican as well as Democratic, who have long demonstrated a realistic understanding of the nature of the long-term competition with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet leadership is already seeking to rekindle optimism about detente and induce complacency in the West about the state of its defenses. We must have leadership that recognizes the realities of Moscow's intentions and will not be deluded by its now-familiar maneuvers. We must be led without illusions about the nature of our relationship with the Soviet Union or the magnitude of the effort we must now commence.

THE PENTAGON

A 'unique' warranty on the troubled F-100

For most of the past five years, the F-100 jet aircraft engine has been hobbled by severe turbine problems. Built by United Technologies Corp.'s Pratt & Whitney Aircraft group to power the F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft, the engine has tended to stall under certain operating conditions. Then, a sudden heat buildup causes its turbine blades to crack and forced landings—or crashes—have resulted.

Now, however, Pratt & Whitney is convinced that more than 300 changes have produced an engine "with reliability like no fighter engine you have ever seen," says one official. And sometime in mid-June the company will offer the Air Force a "unique" warranty covering either wear-out or structural failure of the F-100's turbines for 900 equivalent Tactical Air Command engine cycles—the point at which the Air Force does a field inspection—or roughly after two years of operation. The offer will cover all F-100s delivered to the Air Force starting in 1981 and may be extended to engines on planes delivered to other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries after that date as well.

There is financial risk to UTC in making such a warranty offer, admits Harry J. Gray, chairman of the Hartford (Conn.) company: "We are go-

ing to have to pay money." But because of all the hours the engine has now been flown plus the considerable modifications that have been made on it, "we think we will be able to live up to the warranty without undue exposure," he says. "It is a reasonable risk."

GE responds. In the aerospace industry generally, there is not equal confidence that the F-100 is yet a reasonable warranty risk. But there is consensus that Pratt & Whitney probably had to make some such offer to avoid a decision by the Air Force to replace F-100s in all future F-16 aircraft with an alternate engine, the F-101X, under development by General Electric Co.

General Alton D. Slay, commander of the Air Force Systems Command, has been on a crusade to push back on defense contractors more of the responsibility for the reliability of military systems, and this is a reaction to his "holding Pratt & Whitney's feet to the fire on the F-100," suggests a spokesman for another major military contractor. "Look at Slay's reaction," says a vice-president of another big military equipment manufacturer. "He won't get UTC's warranty proposal for two weeks and already he's applauding it."

At GE, the Pratt & Whitney move got an instant response. "If the Air Force wants a warranty on the F-101X when it goes into production, it can have it," says one GE spokesman. The new GE engine will not get its first flight test until late this year at the earliest. But its early ground tests look good, GE engineers claim. And they say it should be much more durable than the F-100 because it is a simpler and less fragile system.

'Brochuremanship.' While it has provoked GE to make a counteroffer, there is little chance that the Pratt & Whitney warranty offer on the F-100 turbines

A GE warranty, too? Long-term reliability may be the key to orders

will start a stampede of such offers from other military contractors. "The P&W

warranty is a very transparent marketing ploy since the Pentagon is nearing a decision on whether to buy more F-100s or wait for the F-101X," suggests a spokesman for another military aircraft manufacturer. "And there may not be as much of a concession here as Pratt & Whitney would like people to believe." The offer, he points out, will cover only the first 900 cycles that each new F-100 engine is in operation. Air Force specifications for all F-100 engines installed in single-engine F-16s starting next year require them to be qualified for reliable operation over 1,350 cycles.

Pentagon officials also say they see "brochuremanship" in the warranty offer. Until Slay pushed the F-101X into development, they point out, Pratt & Whitney had no competition for what, at a minimum, will be a \$4 billion engine market. When GE entered the picture, estimates of the cost of each F-100 had reached \$2.7 million.

On Capitol Hill, developments are being watched carefully. The Air Force has conceded that the cost of fixing the F-100 now has risen above \$400 million and could top \$700 million before all work is finished, says one congressional source. Also, the Air Force has calculated that its buy of F-100s could run to 4,158 engines by the mid-1980s. But by the time the F-101X is ready for production, close to 2,000 engines will remain to be ordered.

"The hard yardstick on the two engines then will be their life-cycle costs," the congressional source continues. "The P&W warranty proposal is interesting but it isn't the whole story yet. We still have a horse race." ■

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FIVE-MAN GROUP TO REVIEW BROAD ASPECTS OF HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT

A five-man review group named by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the broad aspects of the attempt to rescue hostages from Iran includes a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the general who planned the Son Tay prison raid during the Viet Nam war.

Heading the group, whose work will not duplicate the detailed after-action report now being carried out for the JCS, is retired Adm. J.L. Holloway, a former chief of naval operations.

Working with Holloway since last week when the group was formed are Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, who retired from the Army in 1977 after having served as head of the DIA; retired AF Lt. Gen. L.J. Manor, who was responsible for the Son Tay mission; Air Force Maj. Gen. J.L. Piotrowski, and Marine Corps Maj. Gen. A.M. Gray.

The group's recommendations will be used to help improve U.S. counter-terrorist capabilities. "They are free to call the shots as they see them," and will have access to material not presented to Congress, Pentagon sources said, adding that "selected portions" of their final report—for which no completion date has been set—"will be made public."

Among topics the group is studying, the Pentagon said, are "adequacy of guidance, planning (and) resources." The group was formed at the direction of the joint chiefs, and with the knowledge of the President and the Secretary of Defense. At the moment, there are no plans for the group to interview the President, sources said.

Playing Games With the Defense Budget

By L. EDGAR PRINA
Editor Emeritus

THERE's a story going around Washington these days that goes like this:

Jimmy Carter arrives in Heaven and meets Teddy Roosevelt there. He tells Teddy about all the troubles he's had. First, Iran, with the overthrow of the shah by Moslem militants and the subsequent seizure of the U.S. Embassy and its staff as hostages.

"Well, I guess you sent in the Marines, right, Jimmy?" Teddy asks.

"Well, no," comes the reply. "We tied yellow ribbons around lampposts to show our concern."

Then, Carter brings up the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—another toughie, the 39th President explains.

"Well, you did send in the Marines, this time, I'm sure," Teddy says.

"No, sir," Jimmy replies unabashedly. "But I did tell our athletes they couldn't go to the summer Olympics in Moscow."

With that, an incredulous Teddy winces and says: "Now, come on, Jimmy, the next thing you'll be telling me is that you gave away the Panama Canal!"

Erroneous Budget Estimates

Mr. Carter's reputation for taking firm action when the United States is dumped on is not a shining one. Nor is his reputation for seeing to America's defenses in an increasingly dangerous world. It is no wonder.

He has decided, despite the Soviet invasion of its tiny, backward neighbor, Afghanistan, and the potential threat to Iran and the Middle East oil fields, to cut the defense budget—for both fiscal 1980 and 1981—below previously planned increases.

In late March, he sent to Congress an FY 80 supplemental request of \$2.3 billion and an FY 81 budget amendment calling for an additional \$2.9 billion. The requested increases fall short, by a combined total of approximately \$2.1 billion, of those he promised in January.

The new requests would bring the two budgets to \$141.7 billion and \$161.8 billion, respectively, for appropriations (total obligational authority) and to \$130.8 billion and \$147.1 billion for actual spending.

If Congress approves—and a supercharged debate between advocates of more defense and those who seek a greater social welfare effort is likely—the FY 81 increase in defense appropriations would total 5.2%—adjusted for the Carter administration's inflation estimates, which are far too optimistic. (The real increase, therefore, would be much less than 5.2%.)

Mr. Carter's original budget, which was drawn up before Soviet tanks clanked across the Afghan border, was sent to Capitol Hill on 28 January with a planned hike of 5.4%.

Similarly, the spending rise would be held to 3.1% rather than the 3.3% Mr. Carter had promised.

But even the reduced increases are jeopardized by persistent double-digit inflation. Accordingly, the final chapter of this story cannot yet be written. *The Navy*, certainly, is not going to experience anything like a 5.2%

increase in TOA and 3.1% in spending unless Congress adds substantially to the Carter budget.

Fueling Inflation

What the President has done, in effect, is to request enough additional funds to pay for the tremendous increase in fuel costs projected for next year for the armed services. But the FY 80 supplemental will not even pay for the fuel cost rise.

In FY 81, fuel will cost \$2.9 billion more than originally planned. Other procurement inflation will add \$1 billion. Stepped up Indian Ocean operations and the new Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) will cost nearly \$620 million, for a grand total of \$4.5 billion more than the January budget request. But Mr. Carter asked only \$2.9 billion, an underfunding of \$1.6 billion.

And that's assuming the administration's inflation estimates are valid. But they're not. So the real underfunding is much greater.

For FY 80, rising fuel prices will cost \$2.5 billion and other inflation \$300 million. But instead of \$2.8 billion, the President has requested \$2.3 billion and directed the military services to "absorb" (take it out of their hides) the other \$500 million.

As suggested above, if inflation runs higher than the White House Office of Management & Budget predicts—and it almost always does—the real increases in the defense budget will be smaller still and could wind up in a "negative growth," to use that quintessential expression of Pentagonese.

In coming up with the revised budget plans, the Pentagon directed the services to make offsetting reductions to accommodate the new programs, such as the RDF, which have higher priorities in the wake of the Afghan situation and the perceived threat to the Western world's oil lifelines in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area.

The Navy has already lost (through a rescission notice—which Congress could still disapprove) one FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigate, priced at \$190 million, out of its FY 1980 shipbuilding program of only 12 ships. The Air Force similarly gave up 12 A-7K jet attack aircraft planned for the Air National Guard (\$113 million) and eight C-130 cargo planes (\$75 million). And the Army has had to accept a delay of nearly a year in its high priority DIVAD (division air defense) gun program in order to "save" about \$100 million.

A number of other larger items were also affected. The Navy would delay its HARM anti-radar missile procurement until 1982, for a reduction of \$88 million in FY 1981, and will drop two C-9B fleet logistics aircraft (\$35 million) in FY 1980.

A senior defense official told reporters at a special briefing that increases of \$428 million in the current year and \$619.4 million in FY 1981 for Indian Ocean operations and the Rapid Deployment Force are being requested. He said maintenance of two Navy carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean would cost \$139.4 million more than the \$110 million previously budgeted for FY 1980 and \$205.1 million more in FY 1981.

For expansion of the U.S. Navy base on Diego Garcia, a British-owned island in the middle of the Indian Ocean,

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DEFENSE BUDGET -- CONTINUED

increases of \$11.2 million and \$8.3 million are planned for the two years, respectively.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific, recently recommended a \$1 billion plan for building up Diego Garcia that would involve: (1) expanded runways for B-52 bombers; and (2) the United States taking over the half of the island now under the full control of the British (and where no U.S. buildings or installations are presently located). The plan was studied carefully by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but budget constraints have put it on the back burner, at least for now.

A Promise is a Promise

Most readers of SEA POWER are familiar with Mr. Carter's pledge to the country's NATO partners to increase U.S. defense spending by a minimum of 3% per year—in real terms, that is, after adjusting for inflation. Most readers will also remember his persistent campaign promise in 1976:

"I'll never lie to you and you can depend on that."

Then-candidate Carter did not say, however, that he would not do tricks with budget figures. Nevertheless, when this self-righteous man did, in fact, perform such prestidigitization last month, it came as a shock to many of those who realized the implications of the various budgetary revisions.

What Mr. Carter did was to order new reductions in the FY 1980 defense budget so that he could keep his "3% pledge" in FY 1981.

An 8 April memorandum from John L. Quetsch, acting Pentagon Comptroller, to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, in which the remarkable wool-over-the-eyes ploy was laid out, was leaked to the press. It is worth quoting (with emphasis added), in part:

"Last week, FY 1980 outlays were lowered by \$82 million as a compromise position to account for 3.0% real growth from FY 1980 to FY 1981. Now we are told by OMB staff that John White (OMB deputy director) feels, notwithstanding the agreement to split the difference in dollars, we must show 3.1% real growth.

"To accomplish this requires a further lowering of FY 1980 outlays of \$83 million beyond what OMB agreed to when we split the dollar difference with them. Alternatively, we would have to claim composite inflation of only 8.91% rather than 9.05% in order to arrive at 3.1% real growth if we were not to change the current FY 1980 dollar estimate."

So there it is, a shoddy exercise in juggling figures which the Carter administration can hardly be proud of: cut the FY 1980 budget by \$165 million or arbitrarily change the inflation rate so that the American people and its NATO allies can be told that the United States is increasing its FY 1981 budget by 3.1%.

One is presumably supposed to overlook the fact that the President had also promised to boost military spending by 3% in FY 1980, too.

Less is More

As the Wall Street Journal (whose editor, Robert L. Bartley, recently won a Pulitzer Prize for "distinguished editorial writing") put it, the memo "does not mean more spending for defense next year, it means less spending for defense this year."

There was some good news for defense, however, on 1 April—and one should hasten to add, "no foolin'." The Senate Budget Committee voted that day to increase FY 1981 military spending by \$5.8 billion above the level proposed by Mr. Carter.

The House Budget Committee earlier had recommended \$147.9 billion be spent in the year beginning next 1 October.

But there's a long way to go, with votes still to come in the four big defense panels—the Senate and House armed services and appropriations committees—and then, of course, on the floors of the Senate and House.

Iraqi Diplomatic Strategy

By Claudia Wright

WASHINGTON — At a meeting of Arab League foreign and economic ministers in Amman, Jordan, on July 5, Iraq will propose a new offensive, aimed at Western European governments, for achieving Palestinian statehood.

Iraq takes the view that there is no longer any possibility at this stage of history for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Negotiation, Iraq believes, cannot be effective so long as the Israelis enjoy military superiority and America's unquestioned backing and assistance. Iraq has therefore decided on a campaign designed to undermine Israel's economic links with Europe, and to put pressure on America to choose between its interests in the European alliance and its commitment to Israel.

In interviews I conducted in Baghdad in the first week in May, this strategy was elaborated in unusual detail by the First Deputy Prime Minister, Taha Yasin Ramadan, and the Foreign Minister, Saadoun Hammadi.

"We think that West Europe can do more and should do more than verbalize approval of our position," Mr. Hammadi emphasized. "We are not going to be happy with wise words and nice statements. If the countries of West Europe believe we are on the right side, then they must decide that something concrete and practical should be done."

Iraq's strategy is double-edged. On one hand, the Europeans have been told that Iraq will assure them of the volume of oil they need — more than current levels if necessary — as well as provide substantial opportunities for trading food, consumer products and industrial goods, but the quid pro quo is curtailment of trade and all other contacts with Israel. The second edge of the strategy cuts across the American relationship with Europe. Mr. Ramadan emphasized the importance that Iraq places on non-alignment and being independent of the superpowers. In his view, the American "invasion" of Iran significantly enhances the Arabs' effort at persuading Europeans that in their own self-interest they cannot afford to allow American use of their facilities for action in the Middle East.

One of the targets of Baghdad's effort, he said, is the removal of American bases in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, or their neutralization, so that "at least the bases should not be used against us." Mr. Ramadan indicated that the Iraqi Baath Party is closely linked to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, the anti-NATO Greek op-

position party led by Andreas Papandreu, and, looking at Mr. Papandreu's chances in the elections next year, he said, "We believe the possibility of these relations is very large if something unexpected may occur in the future."

The Iraqis stressed that without Arab League unity, few of their objectives can be achieved. Even with this, Mr. Hammadi said, "We do not believe at this stage in military confrontation. This is a stage of increasing, of building up Arab military ability to achieve the balance which was disturbed by the withdrawal of Egypt." The Iraqis therefore forswear any action that might be construed as threatening Arab unity, even in the cases of Oman, which Iraq has criticized for allowing British and American use of its bases, and Somalia, which is negotiating use of the Berbera base by America's Rapid Deployment Force.

"We are trying to discover their needs," Mr. Hammadi said. "We try to discern that they have security problems and see how serious they are, then try to present to them the possibility of collective Arab measures to satisfy those security necessities. We use all our convincing ability to show them that giving military facilities to the superpowers in the long run will not contribute to their security."

Iraq is specially concerned about Saudi Arabia. Mr. Hammadi disclosed that his Government has actively tried to persuade the Saudi Government to "normalize its relations with the Soviet Union and socialist countries, to have diplomatic relations, to keep technical cooperation with the big powers at an absolute minimum, and not one-sided." He also warned that "if the Saudi Government accepts the principle of modernization in the institutions of government, and if it accepts the policy of non-alignment, real independence, protected by the effort of Saudi Arabia itself and the Arab countries, not through alliances with a superpower, then the country can to a good extent avoid internal disturbances, like the one at Al Aqsa [the Grand Mosque, in Mecca, seized by Arab foes of the regime]. If not, I would expect more disturbances." A number of Iraqi officials leave the clear impression that while Iraq does not threaten Riyadh, it would not remain passive if America moved militarily to save the royal household from an uprising.

Against that possibility, and a variety of other scenarios of possible Middle Eastern conflict, Iraq wants to water the seeds of uncertainty, caution and self-interest in Europe, thereby gaining precious time for the changing balance of economic and military forces in the Arab world to affect change without outside interference.

In the Iraqi view, the United States' raid in Iran may well be the first and the last attempt Washington will be able to make at rapid deployment and military intervention in the region.

Claudia Wright is Washington correspondent for the New Statesman, published in London, and writes frequently on Arab affairs.

Henry Brandon: Schizophrenia in the West

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had an extraordinary catalytic effect. It forced a new pattern on East-West relations, it created a new threat to an area vital to the Western industrial world and it imposed unexpected strains on the Atlantic alliance.

For the United States, it meant a rethinking of its global strategic commitments and additional force requirements. For the European allies, it meant a shift of the focus of American strategic planning that detracts from Europe and a recognition that they, too, will have to accept new responsibilities outside the NATO area. A possible threat to Middle Eastern oil reserves — and hence to the whole fabric of Western society — assumed a greater sense of reality. Thus, the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan falls into quite a different category from that in Angola or Ethiopia.

The United States, without consulting its allies, reacted forcefully and almost instantly to the Soviet thrust. It was out to "punish" the Soviet Union and it wanted the allies to reinforce the punishment. The result was a massive dilemma, with Europe suddenly caught between the need to show solidarity with the United States and the instinctive compulsion to pro-

tect its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

American officials were horrified when they saw a situation develop in which the United States and the Soviet Union were blamed almost equally for the new risks to East-West relations. The Europeans were horrified that they had virtually no way of influencing the situation collectively.

They were clearly reluctant to give up the hard-won gains in Soviet relations achieved over 15 years. With election campaigns in progress in West Germany and France, the issue of relations with the Soviet Union immediately entered the campaigns in a major way.

And so a new doctrine was born — the doctrine of limited freedom of maneuver. It made the United States realize that it cannot not rely on automatic team support by the allies and that a European position somewhat different from its own exists. As one senior American official put it, "Afghanistan did not create the problem, it was the flash of light that illuminated an existing problem."

This official and others admitted that this was not the advent of Europe's "Finlandization" or neutralization, or a new Locarno Pact. After all, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is an Atlanticist to the bone.

Still, it was a new manifestation. And from now on, the question of what it will mean in the long run is bound to come up increasingly.

The European allies insist that the disagreement with the United States is not over the interpretation of the long-range significance of the Afghanistan invasion, but only on how to react to it diplomatically. Sanctions, they argue, entail the risk of failure or semi-failure, and hence can be counterproductive or can blunt the psychological effect.

This is now the case with the Olympic Games boycott. The prestige of the games has been hurt, the Soviet government has been embarrassed, but the disunity of the West in its attitude toward the Soviet Union has also been revealed.

Indicative of the Soviet eagerness to exploit this disunity were the assurances Mr. Gromyko gave to West German Foreign Minister Genscher in Vienna. He confided to him that the absence of the West German team from the Olympic Games will not interfere with Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow, since it was a decision taken by the Olympic Committee, not by the West German government.

Moreover, electoral con-

siderations influence European policies as well as American policies. To Chancellor Schmidt and French President Giscard d'Estaing, it apparently is not only a matter of punishing the Soviet Union but also of being punished by their own electorate. This has contributed to a schizophrenia in the Atlantic alliance whose meaning for the future still is hard to divine. Much will depend on whether the European preference for relying on diplomacy will have its effect on the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, there is an opportunity to revitalize alliance cooperation. It is proper to claim that NATO responsibilities should not be geographically expanded, but this does not mean that the allies, together with the governments in the region, should not develop a common new strategy for the Middle East.

Whatever the consultations that have so far taken place bilaterally and within NATO, they have not yet led to a coherent overall response. But considering the current schizophrenia within the alliance, if its individual members assume a major role outside Europe, this might engender another catalytic effect and reinforce the alliance's overall global significance.

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U.S. AND CHINA NEAR PACTS ON WIDER TIES

Peking May Open New Consulates
— Air Service Possible by Fall

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4 — The United States and China were reported today to be close to signing a series of agreements to significantly expand their already flourishing relationship. Among the steps contemplated by State Department officials is the opening of Chinese consulates in New York, Chicago and Honolulu.

In addition to a consular convention, which officials said was nearly completed, the two sides were reportedly working on a civil aviation accord that could open direct air service between the United States and China by this fall.

An agreement is also expected within a couple of weeks to allow China to receive benefits from the Export-Import Bank of the United States. Negotiations on a textile accord have also resumed.

The accords were cited by officials who were asked to amplify a statement today by Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that "by the end of this year, we will have completed the construction of the basic legal and institutional framework within which economic, cultural, scientific and technological relationships between the American and Chinese peoples can develop their full potential."

In a long policy speech to the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, Mr. Holbrooke said ties with China were now so broad that they went beyond "the famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970's" when the United States seemed to play China against the Soviet Union.

He said that "relations with China are not a simple function of our relations with the Soviet Union," although he noted that Soviet actions could affect Chinese-American ties.

"In the absence of frontal assaults on our common interests," Mr. Holbrooke said, "we will remain — as at present — friends rather than allies."

State Department officials said that the implication of that statement was deliberate, that if the Soviet Union moved militarily beyond Afghanistan into Pakistan, for instance, thereby adopting a more threatening posture, China and the United States might forge closer ties.

Mr. Holbrooke said the American refusal to sell arms to China was also based

on the current situation, suggesting that it could change if events warranted. "We do not sell arms to China, or engage in joint military planning arrangements with the Chinese," he said. "The current international situation does not justify our doing so. Neither we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance relationship."

Mr. Holbrooke noted that "we can and will assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer, including the sale of carefully selected items of dual use technology and defensive military support equipment."

Deputy Prime Minister Geng Biao, who heads China's military establishment, visited here last week. But American officials said they did not know the extent of China's interest in or ability to buy such items as helicopters and military transports from the United States.

Mr. Holbrooke called overall relations with China "good and steadily improving."

"In every area," he said, "we have established, or are on the verge of establishing, much the same framework for our relations that might have developed had recognition not been delayed for 30 years."

"The fears and doubts that were expressed by opponents at the time of normalization have proven ill-founded. The

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Not Weak

By Jesse H. Oppenheimer

SAN ANTONIO — Maybe it is just Presidential fever that is imposing a national inferiority complex on this country. We are barraged daily by declarations of our national weakness and impending demise. Bombarded by politicians, columnists and the defense lobby, we are convinced (the polls show it) that America is a weak, pitiful giant and that the Russians are taking over the world.

But if we examine Soviet advances, we note that gains in recent years have been made mainly in countries that are impoverished and burdensome rather than beneficial: Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos, Libya, Southern Yemen. Cuba continues to cost the Russians \$1 million a day. Only a few years ago, the Soviet Union was closely aligned with China; today, China is not only not aligned with the Soviet Union, but also the two countries offer a direct military threat to each other. Starting in 1955, the Russians were deeply involved in Egyptian affairs, including giving billions in military aid. This ended in 1973 and now Egypt, like China, looks to America for a closer relationship. The Russians have lost influence in Iraq, India and Indonesia. While the Soviet Union has only Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, we have allies and bases throughout Europe and Asia and maintain armed ground, air and sea forces within easy reach of the Soviet heartland.

But what about Afghanistan? The inexcusable military move did not bring any new country into the Soviet orbit. The Russians and Afghanistan have been cozy since 1954. The invasion is proving costly in lives and treasure, and experts say it will never be completely successful. The invasion has been portrayed as a serious loss to us and a

oil and shares a long border with Iran. A Russians took over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Poland when America enjoyed overwhelming military superiority and that the Khomeini forces took over Iran from one of the world's most heavily armed monarchs.

Iranian terrorists certainly did not take the hostages because of our weakness. Could our Cassandras truly believe that we are weaker than Iran? We could probably destroy Iran in an hour. We are warned to strengthen our sea and ground capabilities so that we will have a three- or four-ocean navy, along with mobile strike forces and be able to "control" the Gulf and Indian Ocean. Without doubt, we now have total military superiority over every country in that area or all in combination. Only the Soviet Union compares favorably with us in military might, and the thought that we and the Russians could wage a neatly contained, conventional war in the Middle East is dangerous folly.

The plain fact is that the United States costly, difficult path through Afghanistan is a curious detour to reach Iranian oilfields and the Gulf.

To remedy our supposed inferiority, we are told, we must dedicate even more of our resources to military hardware and that the cure of inflation and our economic ills is secondary to our security needs. Let's remember that the and Soviet Union are strong enough to inflict unacceptable destruction on each other. Neither will ever again allow the other to be militarily dominant to the point of clear superiority.

The Atlantic alliance is essentially a defensive combination. Our allies in Europe and Asia will never willingly enter into a nuclear war in which we are the aggressor so as to retaliate against Soviet "advances" or to protect our "interests" in the Middle East. Europe and Asia also depend on Middle Eastern oil and would not wish to become a nuclear graveyard for what we consider our interests. Recent events involving Japan, India, Pakistan, France and West Ger-

and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry and instability for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over 40 years."

"Longstanding tensions between China, Japan and the United States have been replaced with true dialogue and consultation," Mr. Holbrooke said, adding that tensions in the Taiwan strait "are demonstrably at an historic 30-year low."

As to Chinese-American relations, he said about a hundred Chinese delegations visit the United States each month. "More than 60,000 Americans will visit China this year," he said. By comparison, officials said, about 8,000 Chinese, other than emigrants, had visited the United States in the last 12 months.

many in the relatively minor matters of the Olympic boycott and economic sanctions prove this point. Our NATO alliance may unravel because of our allies' need to proceed with détente while our interest seems to lie in heating up the cold war. Are we really prepared to go it alone?

Our political leaders and those wishing to assume leadership should urge the adoption of credible policies with attainable goals to maintain our world leadership, and, above all, policies that will preserve our economic strength to compete successfully with the other superpower. Nostalgic, jingoistic illusions that we can spend our way to success is debilitating, deluding and diverts our attention from foreign-policy failures and their constructive improvement. We must not substitute military solutions that will not work for political decisions and policies that will work. We have never lost anything, and will never lose anything, because we are not strong enough, but we may lose everything because we are not wise enough.

Jesse H. Oppenheimer is a lawyer.

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Oil-Producing Countries Offered West's Technological Know-How

PARIS, June 4 (UPI)—Western industrialized nations offered oil-producing countries their technological know-how today in an apparent bid to forestall fresh oil price hikes at next Monday's meeting in Algiers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

"The oil price increases in 1979-80 are severely damaging the world economy," said a statement from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development. "Moreover, the occurrence of two large and sudden price increases since 1973 reflect continuing danger for future economic and social development worldwide."

"OECD countries are also ready to strengthen industrial and technological cooperation with oil-exporting developing countries to help them in

their efforts to build strong and diversified economies," the statement from the Ministerial Council of the OECD said.

The OSCE, which represents 24 non-communist countries, including the United States, released the statement at the end of its two-day annual strategy session in Paris.

The ministers also urged joint energy talks with developing countries to help them develop domestic energy resources and thus achieve a more balanced world energy market.

The council said Western inflation might ease slightly over the next 12 months if there is no new round of oil price increases.

Oil prices has risen by more than 130 percent since Jan. 1, 1979, and

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NOTES: The United States and Thailand will jointly support a settlement of the strife in Cambodia that might involve the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. ... The United States has withdrawn all but two of the ships it ordered into South Korean waters when political trouble broke out there May 24.

several oil producers are expected to press for a new sharp upward price adjustment at the coming Algiers meeting.

So far there has been no fulfilled meeting between oil-producing and oil-consuming nations except for modest contacts in the fruitless, French-sponsored "North-South dialogue" round of talks in Paris four years ago.

OECD Secretary General Emile Van Lennep told a news conference that not one member nation can relax its anti-inflationary screws now.

In a special statement, the ministers upheld the need for a continuation of free-trade practices in spite of the rising pressure in member countries for protectionism.

AF secretary says U.S. can be self-sufficient

By Nina Bondarook
Colorado Springs Sun

Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Hans M. Mark said Friday that the only reason the United States still is dependent on Mideast oil is because the country has not yet been "forced" into self-sufficiency.

"This country is capable of developing internal resources," Mark said Tuesday at an Air Force Academy press conference. The reason it hasn't yet? "The answer is we are not hurt enough yet," he said.

In the early 1940s there was a great shortage of natural rubber because the U.S.'s import supplies were completely cut off. However, within 18 months, American industry created a synthetic that was used by the military and for most civilian needs, he added.

History, he said, shows that the same could be done — with oil. But, as long as the Arab nations continue supplying it at a level and price that is still less costly than it would be to

produce synthetic oil, the United States never will begin technological advances necessary to bring it energy independence, he said.

"I have been appalled by the lack of faith and lack of foresight by the people who have the public ear (regarding energy problems)."

Mark said there is no singular method of measuring the readiness of the U.S. military. However, he said, he is confident the nation still is strong.

"I think in terms of our nuclear strategic deterrent forces — the forces on which the nuclear balance we have depends — those forces are ready to go on a moment's notice."

Even though a recent readiness report from the office of the Secretary of Defense indicates U.S. warplanes are plagued with problems, Mark said readiness depends on the particular interpretation of figures and understanding of peace-time military missions and requirements.

According to the report, on the

average, something goes wrong every 18 minutes of flight in the F-14A. On the average, the report states, it takes half an hour for a problem to crop up during an F-15 flight and 12 minutes on the F-111D.

It also states there is a shortage of spare parts, and that the Air Force has to cannibalize its own aircraft to keep an operational fleet. For instance, figures show at any given time 66 percent of the F-111Ds, 44 percent of the F-15s, and 39 percent of the A-7Ds in the U.S. arsenal are down.

Mark said that's because at any given time many are undergoing routine maintenance, are dispatched somewhere for repairs, and are in other situations classifying them as "down." However, those fleets of aircraft all can be operational within a matter of hours, if necessary, he added.

Mark will address the Air Force Academy's graduating class today.

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S. Korean Military Begins Campaign To Win Public Trust, Bolster Prestige

By William Chapman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, June 4—South Korea's military government today launched a campaign to broaden its public appeal and indicated it is preparing to move against public corruption.

Local officials were urged to stimulate broad popular trust of the central government, and reports in the censored press promised a government investigation into corruption in high places.

Both elements were seen as part of a campaign by the military-dominated government to enhance its prestige and broaden its base of support among South Korea's 37 million citizens.

It now rules by martial law edicts imposed last month and it has suspended all the democratic reforms begun by the civilian government in power after the assassination last fall of president Park Chung Hee.

The campaign is being publicly spearheaded by Acting Prime Minister Park Choong Hoon, who was installed by military leaders who took command in mid-May. They are trying to perpetuate the appearance of civilian rule.

Park opened the campaign with remarks to more than 100 provincial governors, prosecutors, and educators at a meeting in the Capitol building.

He urged them to help "create an atmosphere of trust" in the central government and to support efforts to maintain "social stability." Without those elements, he said, South Korea can have neither economic progress

nor political development.

Meanwhile, the hints of a war on corruption emerged in the form of press comments by unidentified officials who were quoted as saying that dishonest public servants would be removed from office. They reportedly were preparing to investigate officials who have allegedly used their public positions to advance their personal interest during the recent period of instability and social unrest.

The anti-corruption campaign is to be waged by a new government group called the Social Purification Subcommittee, one of several new arms of the organization that is running the country under direction of generals who seized power on May 17.

The rapidly multiplying number of committees and subcommittees are all being directed by Lt. Gen. Chon Doo Hwan and two associates.

Ever since they and other generals seized power within the military establishment last December, there have been intermittent reports that they planned an anticorruption crusade. They are admirers of the late president Park and have periodically attempted to justify their moves by asserting that he had come to be surrounded by corrupt military leaders and public officials.

They have also hinted at a purge of allegedly corrupt businessmen and political leaders who, in their phrase, "accumulated great wealth through illegal means." But despite repeated threats, no businessmen have been arrested and only a small number of political leaders have been seized on that charge. The most important is

Kim Jong Pil, president of the Democratic Republican Party, the former government political grouping and long a close friend of president Park.


The current campaign to generate public support for the government is being waged by giving maximum visibility to civilian figureheads and minimum publicity to the generals. The press, which is censored by the martial law command, gives extensive coverage to remarks by both acting Prime Minister Park and President Choi Kyu Hah. Until the past few Choi Kyu Hah. Until the past few public since the May 17 military takeover and rumors had spread he was under some form of house arrest.

The appearance of public support is being advanced by a number of paid advertisements in newspapers sponsored by military-related organizations, such as the Korean Wounded Veterans Association, Police organizations and some business groups are also publishing what amount to testimonials for the present government.

The country is nominally being governed by a 25-member special committee headed by Chon. But real power rests with that organization's standing committee, which is headed by Gen. Chon. His two associates on that standing committee are Maj. Gen. Ro Tae Wop, commander of garrison forces guarding Seoul, and Maj. Gen. Chung Ho Yong, commander of the Army's special forces.

Their standing committee, in turn, has spawned 13 subcommittees that will direct operations of all phases of government, from police to foreign affairs.

Will the Pentagon kill the golden goose?



By James J. Treires

The United States is the world's wealthiest nation, with a gross national product (GNP) nearing \$2.5 trillion. President Carter's military budget calls for 1981 outlays of \$150.5 billion, and Congress wants a further increase.

The Pentagon's main argument in support of this huge budget request is the relationship between these numbers. Even at \$157 billion, the military budget would amount to only 6.3 percent of the GNP. Ergo, the Pentagon concludes, we can easily afford it. Time magazine, using slightly outdated figures, tells us that "social spending is now the largest item in the national budget, amounting to \$423.8 billion this year as compared with \$145.1 billion for defense."

These are comforting ideas. We are evidently a fat, prosperous, pleasure-seeking society that needs only to cut back on a few luxuries — like the lavish "social spending" cited by Time — in order to pay for a big expansion in our military power.

Would that it were so. While the numbers cited above have some basis in fact, a careful look at the United States economy as it is currently functioning tells a much different story.

Beneath the shining surface of the GNP figures lies an ugly reality: The US economy is in shambles. The basic industries which once catapulted America into the number one economic position are losing ground rapidly to foreign competitors. While our government bemoans our dependence on imported oil, a resource whose supply is limited by nature, its economic policies have made us "dependent" on imported automobiles, television sets, shoes, hi-fis, steel, and clothing, all of which we once supplied for ourselves. Although some profits have accrued to US corporations operating abroad, the losses in jobs and income from America's industrial decline have been enormous. The February foreign trade deficit of \$5.6 billion was the worst in our history.

The theory that the US private sector is vigorous and successful without government assistance or coordination is rapidly being destroyed by a fact: Those capitalist democracies that give top priority to their civilian manufacturing industries are crowding American products out of world markets.

America is a nation in serious economic difficulty, barely able to support its current defense expenditures, and in real danger of collapse if that burden is substantially increased.

The measure of a nation's potential military strength is the size of its economic surplus. What we don't need to live on is what we can spend for defense. Before any resources can be used for national defense, the economy must provide the necessities of life for all its people. Before they can fire a rifle, sail a ship, or fly a plane, the men and women in the armed forces must have food, shelter, clothing, and the other amenities of modern life.

It is the crucial relationship between civilian economic base and military expenditures that is now being threatened by the hawks in Congress. Ignoring direct evidence of serious economic crisis all around them, they focus on the abstraction called GNP as proof that a bigger military budget is easily affordable.

Many people are unaware of the fact that military spending is automatically counted as GNP; the more we spend on the Pentagon, the bigger our GNP. Obviously we can't improve our personal economic circumstances by spending more for defense, but we can increase the GNP.

As for the mythical growth of "social spending," most of it is in federal programs that pay for themselves through special contributions — social security, medicare, unemployment compensation. They don't come out of our income taxes and they don't compete for defense dollars.

The raw political power of the military industry lobby in Washington is awesome. Presidential candidates are afraid of being labeled "soft on defense," a code phrase for unwillingness to give the Pentagon more money. Jimmy Carter — the candidate who called for a \$5 billion to \$7 billion cut in military spending — has increased real military spending in every one of his three years in office, and now seeks the biggest boost of all for 1981.

From World War II through the early sixties, the US economy was indeed a golden goose, bringing rapid improvement in the standard of living and the military power required to fight in Korea and Vietnam. By the

Cubans' Kin Barred by Base In Arkansas

By Robert C. Wurmstedt
Time-Life News Service

FORT CHAFFEE, Ark. — The Federal Emergency Management Agency yesterday ordered that no more Cuban-American families be allowed on this base while awaiting release of their Cuban relatives being processed here.

Bill Tidball, agency coordinator here, said he hoped the order would hopefully lower restlessness and tension among the refugees.

From now on all, refugees will be relocated by plane after processing rather than released to relatives waiting here. The presence of the Cuban-Americans in hotels and restaurants also has caused tension in the small communities around Fort Smith, the nearest city.

Meanwhile, tension increased among the several hundred anxious Cuban-Americans already here. Many have been forced to wait for more than a week at the dilapidated theater building on the base about a mile from the refugee compound.

"It's ridiculous," said one Cuban-American, "the only answer I get is I don't know." Some Cuban-Americans have even given up their jobs to come here to find their relatives.

The families last night threatened to march on the refugee compound if their Cuban relatives were not released. Agency officials, anxious for the Cuban-American families to leave, hastily processed some 300 Cubans the families had come for. All through the warm, humid night, yellow school buses brought the Cubans to the old theater building where they were united with the Cuban-Americans.

"Al fin! Al fin! (At last! At last!)" the Cubans shouted as they embraced and poured off the buses as their names were called.

Immigration officials and representatives of the relief agencies, such as the U.S. Catholic Conference, which are arranging sponsors for the refugees deny they asked any families to come here. However, they say they have told some they could expect their relatives to be released soon when they telephone to verify family relationships.

Also, some refugees have called their relatives asking them to come immediately for them, complaining of conditions in the camp.

late sixties, however, it became apparent that our ambitions were outrunning our resources.

In the new era of limits, there is no free ride for the defense establishment. Any increase in the Pentagon budget will bring a proportional decrease in the general welfare as the beneficiaries of federal social programs are already learning. An increase big enough to satisfy Congress's hawks could kill the golden goose.

James J. Treires is chief economist with the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.